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INTRODUCTION

As the year 2000 approached we began to hear rumblings
about the Montana Supreme Court. The court was "inconsistent." It was overruling cases at a high rate. It was
"malpractice not to appeal." This perception pervaded the
Montana bar. It pervades the bar today.1 Were members of the
bar simply complaining about their losses or was their per-

1. See Montana Defense Trial Lawyers Association, Supreme Court Questionnaire,
at http://www.nvo.com/mdtl/bsupremecourtquestionnairb/ (accessed Oct. 21, 2003).
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ception reality? My examination of the Montana Supreme
Court's decisions answers this question. The court was overruling cases at a very high rate.
Why was this so? Was the court's high rate of overruling a
result of forces beyond the court's control? Did it reflect a
philosophy or lack of philosophy among the court's members?
Some answers to these questions may be derived by examination
and measurement. Therefore I looked closely at the Montana
Supreme Court for the period of 1991-2000. My review of this
period reveals that the court's high rate of overruling was not a
result of external circumstances.
In Part I, I begin with a short review of the role that stare
decisis plays in the American judicial system. Part II compares
the interests fostered and frustrated by a rule of adherence to
precedent. Because this is in part an empirical study, I have set
forth my methodology in Part III. Part IV compares the
frequency with which the Montana Supreme Court (1991-2000)
overruled precedent with that of other state supreme courts
during the same period. It also includes a decade by decade
comparison of Montana Supreme Court panels, examining the
frequency with which those courts overruled precedent. The
court's defenders have articulated some explanations and
justifications for its practice. In Part V, I treat each justification
as a testable hypothesis. Some of these hypotheses could be
tested empirically. Others required an analysis of the court's
opinions. As the reader will see, each hypothesis failed under
scrutiny. Part VI reviews the grounds articulated by the court
when it overruled precedent and concludes that the court
frequently ignored the values of stare decisis.
Part VII
examines the court's most common practice, that of overruling
on grounds that a prior decision was manifestly wrong. I
conclude that the court's reliance on this justification has lacked
a principled foundation.
Finally, in Part VIII, I offer a
principled approach to stare decisis.
I. THE "RULE" OF ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT

Before we may engage in any discussion of a principled
approach to stare decisis, we should consider that rule's history,
its virtues, and its failings.
Montana inherited the rule of stare decisis along with the
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rest of English common law, 2 with one modification: state
jurisdictions did not adhere to or follow England's strict rule of
adherence to precedent. 3 Professor Craig Klafter suggests that
England's strict rule was a result of the aristocracy's reaction to
the growing middle class. 4 A strict rule of stare decisis
preserved the privileges and prerogatives the landed class had
5
enjoyed.
Klafter argues that the Revolution severed the connection
between English and American law and that American courts,
in their search to find a way to justify not following English
precedent, adopted a modified version of stare decisis. Under
this modified form, English precedent was persuasive but
American precedent would be binding. American precedent was
lacking, however, so American courts questioned and tested the
English decisions in light of logic, morality, and utility. This
practice came to characterize the American approach to stare
6
decisis even with respect to local precedents.
So, under the American system, an appellate court may
depart from precedent, typically by distinguishing the
precedent. Yet even in the United States, appellate courts
rarely abolish the precedent, changing what all had thought was
a familiar legal landscape, and adopt a new rule.

2.

See Mont. Code Ann. § 1-1-109 (2001).
For it is an established rule to abide by former precedents, where the same
points come again in litigation: as well to keep the scale of justice even and
steady, and not liable to waver with every new judge's opinion; as also because
the law in that case being solemnly declared and determined, what before was
uncertain, and perhaps indifferent, is now become a permanent rule, which it
is not in the breast of any subsequent judge to alter or vary from according to
his private sentiments: he being sworn to determine, not according to his own
private judgment, but according to the known laws and customs of the land;
not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old
one.

I SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND IN FOUR BOOKS

69 (W.D.L. ed., 1900).
3. As of 1934, Professor A.L. Goodhart noted that in England when a prior case is
directly on point, "[i]t is more than a model; it has become a fixed and binding rule."
Arthur L. Goodhart, Precedent in English and Continental Law, 50 LAw Q. REV. 40, 41
(1934).
4. CRAIG E. KLAFTER, REASON OVER PRECEDENTS: ORIGINS OF AMERICAN LEGAL
THOUGHT 33 (1993).

5. Id.
6. Id. at 67-93.
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II. THE VIRTUES AND FAULTS OF STARE DECISIS

Stare decisis has its virtues and shortcomings. Several
interests and policies justify adherence to precedent in a
common law system. Nevertheless, each interest that may
justify adherence to precedent generally has a countervailing
shortcoming. Appellate courts must take note of these virtues
and faults when deciding whether or not to overrule precedent.
I discuss the virtues and their corresponding shortcomings
in the following sections.
A. The Equality Interest.
Stare decisis ensures a degree of fairness. By virtue of the
rule of stare decisis, similarly situated people can expect to be
treated like those in the precedential case.
The equality value of stare decisis fails, however, if the
application of stare decisis leaves the law tipped in favor of one
party or one group. For example, prior to the 1960s, some states
treated like litigants alike according to their race, and stare
decisis preserved this doctrine of separate-but-equal until the
mid-1950s. In that case, adherence to precedent was employed
to maintain inequality.
B. The Interests of Predictabilityand Reliability.
One of the better known values of stare decisis is the value
of predictability or reliability. "[L]aw is essentially an expectation."7 People and institutions should be able to plan their
financial and legal affairs with the expectation that the rules
will not change significantly so as to frustrate those plans.8 This
fosters entrepreneurial behavior by reducing risk and uncertainty. 9

7. Max Radin, Case Law and Stare Decisis: ConcerningPrdjudizienrechtin Amerika,
33 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 211 (1933).
8. See Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, How Should the Supreme Court
Weigh its Own Precedent, at http://writ.findlaw.com/amar/20021213.html (Dec. 13, 2002);
Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Precedent on the High Court: More On & Part
Two of a Three-Part Series on Stare Decisis, at http://writ.findlaw.com/amar/20021227
.html (Dec. 27, 2002); Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Some Final Thoughts on
the Affirmative Action Ruling, and Reliance in a Changing Legal World: Part Three of a
Three-Part Series on Precedent, at http://writ.findlaw.com/amar/20030110.html (Jan. 10,
2003) (discussing the reliance value of United States Supreme Court precedent).
9. The judicial branch differs from the legislative branch on the value of
predictability. I would agree that the legislative branch is specifically empowered to
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The predictability value does not extend equally to all areas
of the law, however. It applies most strongly to interpretation of
contracts, to interpretation of probate instruments, and to
property relationships. These relationships are prospective,
tend to be long-term, and tend to be memorialized in reliance
upon existing law.
The value of predictability applies less strongly in other
areas of the law. In torts cases, for example, we would argue
that an actor should be free to act without the risk of incurring
unforeseen liability. This argument, however, is really about
insurance. Insurers should know what their likely exposure will
be so they may set their premiums accordingly.
Because
insurers rely on a large pool of insureds, and because insurers
reinsure, a court's failure to adhere to stare decisis has a more
limited and indirect effect in torts cases. Insurers may adjust
their actuarial tables following a change in the common law.
They are less likely to be exposed to unforeseen liability.
Predictability has less value when a court changes a
procedural rule, and has the least value when a court changes a
rule prospectively. The Montana Supreme Court, after all, is
free (under the Montana Constitution) to write and change its
procedural rules almost at will, subject only to a legislative
veto. 10 Nevertheless, in any given case the parties may have
relied upon a prior interpretation of a procedural rule and a
change in that interpretation will always work to one party's
detriment. This, however, triggers the predictability value less
and the fairness value more.
C. Interests in Efficiency and Standardization.
Stare decisis increases
does not have to spend as
explaining a decision when
precedent.
Standardization is a

decision making efficiency. A court
much time crafting, justifying, and
it makes the decision on the basis of
combination of predictability and

make significant changes to the rules, changes that would wreck the plans of those who
rely upon the preexisting rules. Unlike the judicial branch, which decides a single case
at a time and may alter the rule in the context of that single case, the legislature is
better equipped to consider arguments about the rule change's effect upon existing social
relationships. Participants are free to go to the legislature to argue against the rule
change or to argue for a mitigation of the rule change (delaying its implementation or
exempting certain relationships, for example) on predictability and other grounds.
10. MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 2(3).
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efficiency. Adherence to a preexisting rule tends to cement it.
The rule becomes standardized as it is tested by new and
different facts. As a result, we can more easily predict what and
how strong the rule is in a later, slightly different context.
D. Avoiding Arbitrary Decision Making and the Values of
InstitutionalLegitimacy and Authority.
From a positivist's standpoint, the validity of a rule depends
in part upon the legitimacy of the institution that issues it.11 If I
declare that all amendments to the state constitution must have
one subject, no one is likely to pay attention to my
pronouncement. When a state supreme court says the same
thing, this has binding effect, not only because we confer the
judicial power upon the supreme court, but also because we
accept and recognize the institution's authority to declare the
rule. When the institution loses legitimacy, however, we are
less likely to accept its pronouncements as authoritative. Its
rule making may be viewed as the whim of its members, to be
12
ignored when convenient, rather than as a rule to be honored.
Resort to stare decisis avoids the de-legitimization of
arbitrary rulemaking by appealing to preexisting principles. We
may analogize arbitrary decision making by a court to the
concept of "checkerboard" statutes. "Checkerboard" laws are a
kind of distributive justice. That is, instead of resolving political
disagreements by watering down or strengthening a
controversial provision, the legislature resolves the disagreement by distributing the burden or the benefit arbitrarily,

11. H.L.A. Hart refers to the rules that establish legitimacy as "rules of recognition."
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 97-107 (1961). Under Hart's construct, the Montana
Supreme Court has authority to say what the law is because a rule of recognition, the
Montana Constitution, recognizes its power to do so.
A rule of recognition
notwithstanding, Hart recognizes, using a scoring official as an analogy, that at some
point an official who is consistently incorrect will lose legitimacy with the players and
fans. Then the game "is no longer cricket or baseball but 'scorer's discretion."' Id. at
141. Henry Monaghan takes a slightly different, pragmatic view when writing about the
role of stare decisis in the United States Supreme Court. In his view, there are some
principles that are so well established that, if they were overruled, massive
destabilization would follow that would threaten the functioning of government and the
constitutional order.
Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional
Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 749-752 (1988).
12. The public's reaction to Marshall v. State ex rel. Cooney, 1999 MT 33, 293 Mont.
274, 975 P.2d 325, which I discuss in Section VI, and the Montana Bar's sense that the
court lacks predictability because it overrules too many cases, are symptoms of lost
legitimacy.
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for example, making some activity illegal on odd-numbered days
and legal on even-numbered days. Such laws "treat similar
13
accidents or occasions ...differently on arbitrary grounds.'
Checkerboard laws suffer from a lack of coherence or
integrity. They are checkerboard because their checkeredness
lacks an element of utility or function. Alternate-side-of-thestreet parking rules, for example, would seem arbitrary and
checkerboard, but for the fact that they have utility. Stated
another way, checkerboard laws bear no rational relationship to
the object they seek to achieve by their checkeredness (except for
the object of trying to please both sides of an issue).
Using this analogy, we see that stare decisis reduces
arbitrariness. A court avoids checkeredness when it treats
accidents or occasions in the same manner as did the precedent
that it follows.
Nevertheless, resort to lack of arbitrariness may be
arbitrary when we preserve a precedent solely for the sake of
stare decisis. In a case in which the precedent lacks utility and
adherence to it denies justice, following the precedent simply
because it is precedent grants stare decisis its own value
independent of other utilitarian or justice values. We might call
this "blind" adherence to precedent.
E. Separationof Powers.
Finally, stare decisis is branch-respecting. 14 When a state
appellate court interprets a statute and the legislature declines
the opportunity to revise the statute in order to "reverse" the
judiciary's interpretation, the court's interpretation should
become part of the statute. When a later court overrules the
earlier interpretation it acts more legislatively than judicially.
If the judicial power is the power to decide disputes and to make
binding orders, 15 then we must ask, what dispute is to be
resolved by re-interpreting a statute that has previously
received an authoritative interpretation? What, other than an
appeal to policy, would warrant overruling the prior
construction? Stare decisis counsels that the power to revise or

13.

RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 178-184 (1986).

14. It is a fundamental constitutional rule that the legislature, not the courts, makes
policy. Duck Inn, Inc. v. Mont. State Univ.-N., 285 Mont. 519, 523-24, 949 P.2d 1179,
1182 (1997).
15. See State ex rel. Bennett v. Bonner, 123 Mont. 414, 425, 214 P.2d 747, 753 (1950).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/3

8

2004

STARE
DECISIS
IN MONTANA
Renz:
Stare Decisis
in Montana

overrule a statute's construction ought to be left to the
legislature, not to a second-guessing appellate court. This is
particularly true when arguments for overruling are made on
the same policy grounds raised or available in the earlier cases.

F. Stare Decisis, the Value of Justice, and Their Relationship to
Abstract, PersonalJudgments.
Before we leave this discussion of the virtues and failings of
stare decisis, we should consider a question that is often raised:
Should we adhere to stare decisis when precedent perpetuates
injustice? Conversely, should we not readily overrule precedent
to ensure justice? When a court overrules precedent only on the
basis of its view of justice, has it acted in a principled manner or
does its decision reflect a personalized judgment?
These questions are commonly raised by reference to Plessy
1 6 and Brown v. Board of
v. Ferguson,
Education.17 Plessy held
that separate railway car accommodations based on race were
lawful, so long as the accommodations were equal.' 8 Brown
rejected Plessy's separate but equal doctrine. 19
It is very easy for us, living in the Twenty-First Century, to
say that we "know" Plessy was unjust. If we know that Plessy's
rule was unjust, then we should conclude not only that it was
proper to overrule Plessy in 1954, but also that the United
States Supreme Court should have overruled Plessy before 1954.
For our superior knowledge also means we know that Plessy was
always unjust. Therefore, our conclusion that Plessy should
have been overturned earlier than it was eventually reaches the
year 1896, when Plessy was decided. We may conclude, then,
that Justice Harlan's dissent should have been the majority
20
opinion.
But Harlan's was not the majority opinion, and we see
therefore that any statements in the abstract about Plessy's
injustice fail to tell us why Plessy was properly overruled.
Plessy was decided by judges who had been, with the
exception of the recently appointed Justice White, born before

16. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
17. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
18. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551-552.
19. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
20. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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1840.
All would have been exposed to the physical
anthropological findings of Dr. Samuel Morton and the neoDarwinist theory of Harvard's Louis Agassiz. Morton's and
Bean's studies on skull size and their conclusions that Africans
had cranial capacities significantly smaller than Caucasians
influenced educated people of the time. Agassiz, America's
leading naturalist in the mid-Nineteenth Century, contended
that Blacks and Whites were separate species.
The Plessy justices would not have known that Morton had
manipulated his data. Agassiz had yet to be wrecked on
Darwin's shore. 21 It should be no surprise then that Plessy
tastes of the flavor of protection of the inferior being, all the
22
while disclaiming equality of the races.
We are able to say today that Plessy was unjust because
"separate but equal" failed as a social experiment. Lacking
Justice Harlan's foresight and lacking experience with the
doctrine, we might not have said that in 1896. Had we been a
member of the Plessy majority, we might well have believed that
we were doing good. Operating on these conceptions, later we
would have considered it an injustice to overrule Plessy. We
would have laid down the "White Man's Burden" had we forced a
so-called "less gifted" group to compete with white children in
public schools, much less to expose them to the harm of sitting
with white passengers on Louisiana's railroad trains.
By 1954, however, Nineteenth Century biological determinism had long been debunked and the era's theory of eugenics
had been extinguished in the ovens of Central Europe. The data
upon which these theories rested had been shown to have been
manipulated. 23 Blacks were seen to have performed so well in
the Second World War that military units had been
desegregated-without the terrible results that would have been
predicted in 1896.24

21.

See STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 74-104 (rev. ed. 1996).

22. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544-545 (comparing establishment of special schools for Black
children with the establishment of special schools for the poor or for girls).
23. Franklin P. Mall, On Several Anatomical Charactersof the Human Brain Said to
Vary According to Race and Sex, with Especial Reference to the Weight of the Frontal
Lobe, 9 AM. J. OF ANATOMY 1, 7-12, 32 (1909) (concluding that Robert Bean's data on
brain tissue had been affected by Bean's knowledge of the sources of each brain he
measured).

24. Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 26, 1948); see also Brief of Amicus
Curiae Am. Veterans Comm. at 1-2, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Thurgood Marshall brilliantly saw the role of social science
in this debate and employed it for his purposes. 25 Changes in
circumstances and demonstrations by historical fact that
separate was not equal led to the overruling of Plessy.26 Thus
we see that Brown overruled Plessy not because "separate but
equal" was unjust, but because experience with the rule proved
it to be unjust. This is the difference between the overturning of
precedent for principled reasons and the overturning of
precedent on the basis of abstract, personal judgment.
Judicial decision making that is premised on abstract or
personal notions of justice or injustice departs from the rule of
law. When personal notions of justice govern a dispute, the rule
of law becomes the rule of judges. While applying personal
notions of justice and injustice might have shortened Plessy's
harm, in the long run applying personal notions of justice and
injustice result in personalized, not democratic, rules of law.
Reasonable adherence to precedent preserves the rule of law by
limiting the freedom of judges to decide cases. The rule of law
and reasonable adherence to the precedents that interpret and
elaborate on that law, over the long run, preserve liberty and
foster justice.
G. Conclusion.
All of these things said, it is proper for a court to depart
from precedent on occasion, whether by distinguishing the new
case or overruling the old case. Principles that arise from prior
decisions occasionally need repair. This is true not because the
later court thinks the earlier decision poorly reasoned (that is
mere second-guessing), but because experience or change shows
that the principle is either incomplete or flawed.
This
experience can be in the practical application of a rule. Change,
by which I mean changes in society (including evolution of the
law), may also show that a rule, once valid and practical, has
lost its utility. As we shall see, although the Montana Supreme
Court paid lip-service to the idea that earlier rules needed
repair, the court rarely applied this idea in a principled way
during the 1991-2000 decade.

25. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 n.11 (noting social science studies of the effects of
segregation on the development of Black children).
26. Id. at 492-493.
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III. METHODOLOGY
I employed two Westlaw search strings 27 that produced a
citation list of over 170 Montana Supreme Court decisions,
among which were nearly all, if not all, cases in which the court
had overruled precedent during 1991-2000. This search string
also produced cases in which the court did not overrule its
precedents. A quick reading of the cases eliminated those. I
conducted similar searches for 1891-1991.28
I repeated the same searches for eleven other states for the
1991-2000 period. I examined decisions from Delaware, Maine,
New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, Rhode Island,
Nevada, Vermont, and Wyoming. These states, like Montana,
lack intermediate appellate courts. Out of curiosity, I ran the
same searches for the Idaho and Washington Supreme Courts,
as two other illustrative states in the region.
Once I had identified the Montana "overruling" decisions, I
read each one. I sought and found patterns among the court's
declarations that a precedent ought to be overruled. I discuss
those patterns in Part VI of this article.
IV. HISTORICAL AND STATE-BY-STATE COMPARISONS

A. Historical Comparison.
The rate at which the Montana Supreme Court has
overruled precedent increased substantially in recent decades.
Figure 1 describes the change in the rate of overruling from
1891 to date:

27. "IS OVERRULED" "WE OVERRULE" "ARE OVERRULED" OVERRULING ("TO
THE EXTENT" +P (OVERRUL! REVERS!)) & DA(AFT 12-31-1990). "WE EXPRESSLY
OVERRULE" "ARE EXPRESSLY OVERRULED" "IS EXPRESSLY OVERRULED."
28. Because the court, in the demurrer and exception days, tended to declare that it
or a lower court had overruled or reversed a demurrer, I added the limiter "%
((OVERRUL! REVERS!) +4 (OBJECTION* DEMURRER)) (MOTION +3 OVERRUL!),"
to the first search string in order to reduce the volume of unrelated cases. To determine
the effect of the limiter, I added it to the 1991-2000 search string and discovered that it
eliminated only one case in which the court had overruled precedent.
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Figure 1. No. of cases overruling, by decade

(Montana Supreme Court).
Beginning in 1970, the court's rate of overruling precedent
increased geometrically as it doubled, redoubled, and redoubled
again during each succeeding decade.
29
The results give rise to one conclusion: the current court
has been the most active in Montana's history. It has been
rewriting law at an unprecedented rate. The rate is reflected
not only in the number of decisions that overruled precedent,
but also in the number of past cases that were overturned. The
31
30
109 "overruling" decisions invalidated 249 cases.

29. It is fair to call this the current court. Four members of the current court sat in
2000. A fifth member, Justice Cotter, elected in 2001, defended the court's overruling
practice at public meetings during the election.
30. The decisions, and the cases that they overruled, are collected in the Appendix.
31. The total may exceed 249. In 1997, the court began including catch-all phrases
when it overruled precedent. In State v. Lawrence, 285 Mont. 140, 161, 948 P.2d 186,
199 (1997) (overruling State v. MeSloy, 127 Mont. 265, 261 P.2d 663 (1953)), for example,
the court stated: "Our research does not reveal any cases citing MeSloy for the particular
position here advanced by Appellant, but if any exist, they too are overruled to the extent
they are inconsistent with Rule 613(b)." See Dobrocke v. City of Columbia Falls, 2000
MT 179, 47, 300 Mont. 348, 47, 8 P.3d 71, 47 (overruling two cases "and any other
cases" that hold that notice of a defect is required before a landowner has a duty of care),
overruled by Roberts v. Nickey, 2002 MT 37, 308 Mont. 335, 43 P.3d 263; State v. Lane,
41 (overruling four reported
41, 957 P.2d 9,
41, 288 Mont. 286,
1998 MT 76,
decisions "and any other Montana case that has held that the written judgment and
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B. State-by-State Comparison.
Viewing the historical rate in isolation does not tell us much
about its relevance. Perhaps a high rate of overruling was
normal
for late-Twentieth
Century
appellate
courts.
Accordingly I measured the frequency with which supreme
courts overruled precedent in states that, like Montana, lack
intermediate appellate courts. Figure 2 displays the frequency
of overruling for the period 1991-2000 in ten states (including
Montana) that lack intermediate appellate courts.
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Figure 2. No. of cases overruling, by state (1991-2000).
As Figure 2 illustrates, the rate of overruling in Montana
exceeded the rates of these other states, not by a few cases, but
by multiples of up to seventeen (if we overlook Rhode Island).
To place these findings in a different perspective, the rate at
which Vermont was overruling its precedent generated a
Vermont Bar Journal article criticizing the practice. 32 Yet the
Vermont Supreme Court had overruled only thirty-nine cases
over the course of sixteen years.
These data give rise to a second observation: the Montana
Supreme Court has been the most active among similar state
supreme courts.
commitment is the valid, final judgment."). We cannot fault the court for lack of
thoroughness.
32. Paul S. Gillies, Overruling, 23 VT. B.J. & L. DIG. 12 (1997). Gillies criticized the
Vermont Supreme Court for overruling its prior decisions in 39 cases since 1980.
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These two observations tell us only that the Montana
Supreme Court overrules precedent more frequently than it once
did, and that it overrules precedent more frequently than
similar state supreme courts. This may, however, be the result
of circumstances unique to Montana and beyond the control of
the court. I now examine that question.
V. FIVE HYPOTHESES

During the 1999-2000 election cycle, the court's frequency of
overruling was a topic of discussion.3 3 Some criticized the
Each
court's practice; others defended or justified it.
justification suggested that some circumstance, beyond the
court's control, explained the frequency with which it overruled
precedent. Those who explained the court's practice offered five
arguments: (1) the court is overruling more cases because its
case load has increased; (2) the court is overruling more cases
because there is a greater body of case law today than there has
been in the past (I call this the "so many cases, so little time"
justification); (3) the court is not overruling any more cases than
have past courts-instead the court is simply being honest in
doing expressly what past courts did impliedly or sub rosa;34 (4)
the court is doing nothing more than correcting conflicts
between cases; 35 (5) the court's actions are a result of the 1972
Constitution. 36 We may treat each explanation as a testable
hypothesis. In the following sections, I test each hypothesis to
37
determine if it explains the results we observed above.

33. See Jeff Renz, The Quiet Revolution in the Montana Supreme Court, GREAT FALLS
TRIBUNE, February 13, 2000, at 8A.
34. This hypothesis was offered by former Associate Justice Trieweiler, while a

candidate for Chief Justice.
35. This defense was offered by Associate Justice Cotter and Associate Justice
Leaphart, who were candidates for Associate Justice during the 2000 and 2002 elections,
respectively. See Bob Anez, Primary Will Cut Court Race from Four to Two, HELENA
INDEPENDENT RECORD, May 24, 2000, available at http://www.helenair.com/articles/
2000/05f24storiesfhelena/cla.txt.
36. This claim has been made by several justices. See Carolynn Bright, Candidate
Face-off, HELENA INDEPENDENT RECORD, Oct. 29, 2002, available at http://www.helenair.
com/articles/2002/10/29/stories/montanalla5.txt (Justice William Leaphart).
37. No defender of the court's practice has argued that a high rate of overruling was
necessary to correct older biases of a "pro-Anaconda Copper Company Court," for
example, or that the high rate of overruling was explained by other valid reasons for
overruling precedent.
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Hypothesis 1: "The Court's Case Load is Much Larger."
This hypothesis assumes that a higher rate of overruling
correlates to a higher case load. Put simply, if a court that
issues 100 decisions per year overrules precedent in two of those
decisions, then a court that issues 200 decisions is likely to
overrule precedent in four of its decisions. This theory sounds
reasonable. Statistical analysis, however, does not support this
explanation for the Montana Supreme Court's practice.
The National Center for State Courts maintains statistics
on new case filings for all state supreme courts. 38 The new case
filings for Montana and nine other states are set forth in Table
1.
MONTANA ........................ 6124
NORTH DAKOTA ............. 3818
DELAWARE ...................... 5414
RHODE ISLAND ............... 4319
M AIN E ............................... 7689
SOUTH DAKOTA .............. 3829
NEVADA .......................... 15339
VERM ONT ......................... 5896
NEW HAMPSHIRE ........... 8271
WYOMING ......................... 3426
Table 1. New Case Filings During 1991-2000. 39
During 1991-2000, two states had case loads similar to
Montana's. Montana had 6124 new filings, Vermont had 5896
new filings, and New Hampshire had 8271.
The Vermont
Supreme Court overruled precedent in twenty-four decisions
during 1991-2000. The New Hampshire Supreme Court issued
eight decisions that overturned past precedent during the same
decade. In contrast, Montana overruled precedent in 109 cases.
Similar case loads in these states did not lead to a similar high
frequency of overruling.
When we reduce each state's frequency of overruling to a
rate of overruling per 1000 new filings, we generate this set of
results:

38. NATIONAL COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: THE
STATE OF THE ART 176-178, tbl.13 (2001).

39.

Id.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/3

16

2004

STARE
DECISIS
IN inMONTANA
Renz:
Stare Decisis
Montana
MONTANA .........................
NORTH DAKOTA ..............
DELAWARE .......................
RHODE ISLAND ................
MA IN E ................................
SOUTH DAKOTA ...............
N EVADA ...............................
VERMONT ..........................
NEW HAMPSHIRE ............
WYOMING ..........................

17.8
4.98
1.29
0.46
0.91
2.09
2.8
4.07
0.73
2.63

Table 2. Number of cases overruling precedent,
per 1000 new filings (1991-2000).
These two comparisons demonstrate that case load does not
explain the frequency of overruling in Montana. 40 Case load
correlates to frequency of overruling in nine state supreme
courts. When Montana's data are included, however, this statistical relationship disappears.
Although Montana's data dampens the statistical inference
that there is a relationship between case load and frequency of
overruling among state courts, this observation merely compares
the Montana Supreme Court with nine other state supreme
courts. It is possible that the Montana Supreme Court has
historically overruled more frequently than other state courts
and that growth in the case load is the sole or primary

40. The frequency of overruling should vary among states. It is therefore possible
that normal variation explains Montana's data. We can test this with the correlation
coefficient (Pearson's r) between caseload and overruling decisions, omitting and
including Montana's totals. The correlation coefficient measures the consistency with
which one set of data changes as a second set of data changes. A correlation coefficient
of +1 would show perfect correlation. A coefficient of 0 shows no correlation. A
correlation coefficient of -1 demonstrates an inverse correlation (as A goes up, B goes
down). In this case, we want to measure the strength of the correlation between case
filings and rates of overruling. When Montana's data are omitted, the correlation
coefficient between case filing and number of overruling cases is .73 (R2 = .54). This
demonstrates high correlation between caseload and the rate at which the supreme
courts in these nine states overruled precedent. That is, as case filings increased, the
number of cases overruling precedent tended to increase. When we add Montana's data
to those of the other nine states, however, the correlation coefficient drops to .25 (R2 =
.06). This demonstrates little relationship between caseload and number of cases
overruling precedent.
More important, Montana's numbers are so skewed, they
demonstrably reduce the strength of the relationship that we observed when Montana's
numbers were omitted.
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explanation for the rate at which it overruled cases in the 1990s.
We test this hypothesis by looking at the rate at which the
court overruled prior decisions, compared to its historic case
load. 41 This is the result:

1891-1900
1901-1910
1911-1920
1921-1930
1931-1940
1941-1950
1951-1960
1961-1970
1971-1980
1981-1990

Rate per
1000
case load
3.5
1.3
0.7
2.7
6.0
7.0
13.1
7.3
8.6
13.1

1991-2000

23.542

Decade

Table 3. Rate of overruling per 1000 cases, by decade
(Montana Supreme Court, 1891-2000).
The mean rate for 1891-2000 is 7.9 cases per 1000. The
mean rate for 1891-1990 is 6.4 cases per 1000. Employing the
mean rate during 1891-1990, we would predict that the court
would have overruled decisions in thirty cases (which is still
quite high when compared to the other nine states), not 109
cases, during the 1991-2000 decade. 43 This result tells us that

41. Note that the rate for 1991-2000 differs from that shown in Table 2. Because
statistics for new case filings were not readily available for earlier decades, I have
employed a measure of caseload that is different from the measure that I used to
compare state courts. Here I have estimated the caseload by employing the total number
of opinions issued by the Montana Supreme Court and reported on Westlaw during each
decade.
42. During the 1990s, the Montana Supreme Court issued more unreported orders
and "non-cite" opinions than it had in the past. I have not included these in the total
caseload for any decade because the court deliberately treated them as non-precedential.
43. If we base the expected value on a regression analysis-that is, if we extrapolate
the past rate of growth, the expected value for 1991-2000 is 53.3 cases, half of what we
observed during this period.
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case load does not explain the 1991-2000 rate. 44
4631

5000
4500
4000

A382
0

-3500
3000
2500
2000

6
154 =
"

133
3

1681500
54z
.,r A1381000
500

1891-1900 1901-1910 1911-1920 1921-1930 1931-1940 1941-1950 1951-1960 1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000

0

Figure 3. Total reported decisions, by decade
(Montana Supreme Court, 1891-2000).
Consider one more obvious measure. The court's case load
increased roughly linearly since 1941. 45 No decade saw a case
load increase greater than seventy-four percent over the
preceding decade. The mean rate of increase was forty-one
percent during this period. The 1991-2000 case load increased
by twenty-nine percent over the preceding decade, marking a
return to 1941-1970 case load growth rates.
The rate of overruling, in comparison, has more than
doubled each decade since 1970.46 This is one more indicator
that case load does not explain the court's work during 1991-

44. One final statistical tool tests the historical caseload hypothesis. The Spearman
Rank Correlation Coefficient (Spearman's r) compares the rankings of two sets of scores.
The 1991-2000 data point lies more than two standard deviations from the mean.
Because the 1991-2000 data-point is an outlier, a rank correlation is more appropriate
than Pearson's r. See LOTHAR SACHS, APPLIED STATISTICS: A HANDBOOK OF TECHNIQUES
395 (2d ed. 1984); MICHAEL 0. FINKELSTEIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 348 (2d ed. 2001).
Spearman's r ignores the actual number of cases, except to rank them. We may think of
this test in this way: If the rank of the total case load for every decade was the same as
the rank for the total cases overruling for the same decade, then we would have a perfect
correlation. In that instance Spearman's r would be 1.0. Spearman's r for 1891-2000 is
0.46, which indicates poor rank correlation. (The 10% significance level is .549.) In
other words, the ranking of the caseload had little connection to the ranking for the
number of overruling cases.
45. See Figure 3.
46. See supra Figure 1.
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2000.
Testing therefore compels us to reject the case load
hypothesis. No test confirms the hypothesis that the court's rate
of overruling is explained by the court's case load. Each test
refutes the hypothesis. We must therefore look to the next
hypothesis on our list.
Hypothesis 2: "So Many Cases, So Little Time!"
The second theory assumes that, because of the passage of
time, there is more outdated and conflicting precedent
languishing in the reports and therefore more precedent to
overrule.
Put differently, cases decided at the end of the
Nineteenth Century would have less application to disputes that
arose at the end of the Twentieth.
The data do not bear out this theory. The appellate courts
of Delaware, New Hampshire, Maine, and Vermont were
deciding appeals before Lewis and Clark came to the Great Falls
of the Missouri. Yet their rates of overruling fail to approach
47
that of the Montana Supreme Court.
Hypothesis 3: "The Current Court has More Integrity."
The third explanation, that the current court is more
intellectually honest because it does expressly what past courts
have done impliedly or quietly, is not borne out by data. In fact,
the opposite is true. During 1991-2000, the Montana Supreme
Court was more active in impliedly overruling cases than were
past courts.
In order to test this hypothesis, I pulled from Westlaw a list
of every case decided by the Montana Supreme Court since 1889.
I relied on Westlaw's KeyCite service to determine which among
those cases had been "red-flagged." 48 I eliminated from the list
those cases I had previously identified as having been expressly
overruled. I reviewed Westlaw's history of the remaining redflagged cases to identify those which were arguably impliedly or

47. See supra Table 2.
48. Westlaw employs red and yellow flags to warn practitioners when a case lacks
precedential effect or when the case's precedential effect has been questioned in some
way. For example, a case that has been overruled or reversed or whose opinion has been
vacated, among other things, will be red-flagged. A case that has been, among other
things, distinguished by any court anywhere will be yellow-flagged.
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tacitly overruled.
The resulting set included cases in which a later case
"abrogated," "limited," "disagreed with," "declined to follow,"
"disapproved," "rejected," "abandoned," "departed from,"
"repudiated," "refused to follow," or "criticized" the questioned
case, or in which a later case "recognized" that one of the
foregoing had occurred with respect to the questioned case. I did
not include cases in which the later case recognized that the
questioned holding had been superseded by a statute, rule, or
constitutional provision. I also did not include cases that had
been distinguished. 49 I examined those cases that "abrogated, et
cetera" earlier cases to determine what had been done. When a
later case "recognized" an earlier adverse action, I read that
later case to determine which case had "taken" the adverse
action.
For convenience, I will refer to these as "tacit"
overrulings.
The results are set out in Table 4:

Decade
1891-1900
1901-1910
1911-1920
1921-1930
1931-1940
1941-1950
1951-1960
1961-1970
1971-1980
1981-1990
1991-2000

No. of cases
tacitly
overruling
2
7
2
5
8
7
4
9
7
21
33

No. of cases
tacitly
overruled
2
7
2
5
8
7
4
9
8
32
69

Table 4. Cases Tacitly Overruling Precedent,
by Decade (1891-2000).
The hypothesis that the current court does expressly what
prior Montana Supreme Courts did tacitly is not supported by

49. A case that is repeatedly distinguished loses precedential value. I did not include
such cases in the first set unless later cases "recognized" that repeatedly distinguished
cases had been abrogated, limited, et cetera.
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the data. In fact, the data shows that the current court was as
active in tacitly overruling precedent as it was in expressly
overruling past decisions. Moreover, the current court swept
with a wide broom, overruling an average of two cases with
every decision that tacitly overruled precedent.
The numbers for the 1991-2000 period are lower now than
they will be. Later courts may recognize that the Montana
Supreme Court of the 1990s tacitly overruled additional
decisions. So we must reject the intellectual honesty theory.
Hypothesis 4: "Too Many Decisionsare in Conflict."
The next justification for overruling argues that the court is
merely doing its job by reconciling conflicting precedent. To
determine if this explains the court's behavior, I read each of the
109 cases in order to identify the court's grounds for overruling.
The results of my examination do not confirm this hypothesis.
Of the 109 decisions expressly overruling precedent in the 19912000 decade, only sixteen resolved conflicts between or among
prior decisions or lines of decision.50 I should note, however,
that in eighteen additional cases the court purported to resolve
conflicts between precedents.5 1 These, however, were cases that
would normally have been distinguished on their facts or
distinguished by changes in the language of the statute at issue.
In those eighteen, a simple explanation as to why the earlier
cases are distinguishable would have sufficed. The conflict
hypothesis does not fully explain the court's action. I will
elaborate further on this below, when I examine the court's
decisions.
Hypothesis 5: "Blame the Constitution!Full Speed Ahead!"
The final explanation is that the adoption of the 1972
Constitution so altered the legal landscape that dozens of prior
decisions became obsolete. My reading of the cases shows that
this is not so. The hypothesis is readily destroyed by two
observations. Of the 109 decisions, one dozen decided an issue
of constitutional law.
Only two suggested that the 1972
52
Constitution compelled the court's action.

50. See infra Part VI(A)(1).
51. See infra Table 5.
52. Marshall v. State ex rel. Cooney, 1999 MT 33, 293 Mont. 274, 975 P.2d 325; Town
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I conclude that the frequency with which the Montana
Supreme Court overruled precedent was extraordinary and that
it cannot be explained by factors beyond the court's control.
Nevertheless that is only half of the question. The court's
decisions may not be explained by external factors, but they may
still be reasonable. To test this, we must turn to the cases
themselves.
VI. THE COURT'S ARTICULATED REASONS FOR OVERRULING

The Montana Supreme Court overruled precedent in 109
cases during 1991-2000. This number describes only magnitude
when we compare it with the frequency of overruling by other
state courts and with the historical practice of the Montana
Supreme Court. The number does not explain why the court
overruled precedent in 109 cases.
If the court overruled
precedent in 109 cases because overruling was necessary, that
tells us something about the state of the law. Then we may
conclude that the law may have been stable, but that it was
riddled with conflicting precedents and antiquated rules. On the
other hand, if the court has been overruling precedent without
good reason, that tells us something about the court.
To answer these questions I read each Montana Supreme
Court opinion that overruled precedent with the following
categories and questions in mind:
*
What was the nature of the case? That is, was it a criminal
case, a personal injury case, or another kind of proceeding?
*
Who would benefit in the future from the change in the
court's direction?
My review of the cases generated these
categories:
(1) parties opposing the exercise of government civil power
were favored or disfavored;
(2) criminal defendants were favored or disfavored;
(3) shareholder dissenters were favored or disfavored;
(4) plaintiffs in workers compensation, personal injury,
civil rights, or employment cases were favored or
disfavored;
(5) easement challengers were favored or disfavored;
(6) spouses seeking property in dissolution proceedings
Pump, Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 1998 MT 294, 292 Mont. 6, 971 P.2d 349. I discuss
Marshall below.
The 1972 Montana Constitution has had a profound effect on
Montana's jurisprudence. It just does not show up in those cases in which the court
expressly overruled precedent.
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were favored or disfavored;
natural or non-custodial natural parents were favored
or disfavored;
(8) children in child protection and similar cases were
favored or disfavored;
(9) tenants in landlord-tenant disputes were favored or
disfavored; and
(10) accused contemnors were favored or disfavored.
53
I tally these results below.
*
What was the issue before the court? If the nature of the
case was "Personal Injury" and the answer to the second
question was "Personal Injury Plaintiff Favored," the case could
nevertheless encompass such issues as common law negligence,
civil procedure, or statutory interpretation. I identified fifteen
issues (the number in parentheses represents the number of
cases in which they appear):
*
statutory construction (48);
*
constitutional law (12);
*
criminal procedure (12);
*
torts (10);
*
evidence (7);
*
civil procedure (5);
*
jurisdiction (4);
*
standard of appellate review (4);
*
marital property (2);
*
property (2);
•
administrative law (2);
*
taxation, contracts, appellate procedure, and standards
54
of proof (1 each).
* What were the majority's grounds for overruling? Most
grounds were articulated by the court. When the grounds were
not articulated I gleaned them from the opinion. While some
readers may disagree with my categorization of a given case, I
believe the patterns that I set forth here are accurate. My
analysis revealed seven general categories:
(1) The court perceived a conflict between lines of cases but
the conflict was in fact nonexistent. These cases are
those in which most courts distinguish rather than
overrule the precedent.
(7)

53.
54.

See infra Table 6.
These total 112, not 109, because some cases addressed more than one issue.
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(2)

There was an actual conflict between prior decisions or
between lines of authority.
(3) The court decided that a prior decision or prior line of
cases was wrong or that another rule was better. These
holdings were often justified by the court's manifest
error doctrine 55-its declaration that the prior decisions
'56
were "manifestly wrong.
(4) The court overruled a prior decision or prior decisions
even though it did not have to, because either an act of
the legislature or changes wrought by the 1972
Constitution had superseded the prior line of authority.
(5) The development of the law called into question the
utility or soundness of the overruled line of cases.
(6) Experience with the rule or the development of society
called into question the utility of the overruled line of
cases.
(7) The court overruled precedent, but overruling was not
necessary to the resolution of issues raised by the case.
Here are the total number of decisions, by category, for 19912000:

55. See discussion infra Section VII. It is inaccurate to call the manifest error
doctrine a "doctrine." If there were an objective test to distinguish among decisions that
were correct, in error, or manifestly in error, then we might call the manifest error claim
a doctrine. All we can say now, however, is that an opinion is manifestly in error when a
majority of justices say that it is.
56. See Beckman v. Butte-Silver Bow County, 2000 MT 112,
20, 299 Mont. 389,
20, 1 P.3d 348, 20; State v. Gatts, 279 Mont. 42, 51, 928 P.2d 114, 119 (1996); Haugen
v. Blaine Bank of Mont., 279 Mont. 1, 9, 926 P.2d 1364, 1368.1369 (1996); State v. Long,
216 Mont. 65, 73, 700 P.2d 153, 158 (1985) (Weber, J., concurring); Formicove, Inc. v.
Burlington N., Inc., 207 Mont. 189, 194-195, 673 P.2d 469, 472 (1983).
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No. of

Decisions

Another rule is better or the existing rule is wrong

47

Actual conflict between prior decisions

16

Perceived (but non-existent) conflict with another line of decisions

18

Development of law calls into question validity of past holding(s)

14

Experience has shown the rule to be unworkable or invalid

9

Legislature / new constitution has superseded the earlier case

4

Overruling is superfluous to the resolution of future cases

2

Table 5. Reasons for Overruling (1991-2000).

57

Next, did the court favor any group of litigants?
decisions revealed this pattern:

The

No. of

Nature of Outcome

D o ns
iDecisions

Pers. Injury/Workers' Comp./Civil Rights/Employee Pls. Favored

36

Pers. Injury/Workers' Comp./Civil Rights/Employee Pls. Disfavored

5

Pers. Injury/Workers' Comp./Civil Rights/Employee Pls. Neutral

1

Criminal Defendants Favored

21

Criminal Defendants Disfavored

14

Criminal Defendants Neutral

3

Government Opponent Favored

2

Government Opponent Disfavored

5

Spouse Seeking Marital Property Favored

5

Spouse Seeking Marital Property Disfavored

2

Spouse Seeking Marital Property Neutral

1

Easement Challenger Favored

2

Easement Challenger Disfavored

1

Easement Challenger Neutral

Table 6. Five Categories of Cases (1991-2000).

1

58

57. The total is 100 because State v. Lawrence overruled two sets of cases for
unrelated propositions and for different reasons. 285 Mont. 140, 159, 161, 948 P.2d 186,
198-99 (1997) (holding that claimed lapse of memory is an inconsistent statement that
may be impeached, and overruling McSloy because McSloy was based on a now-repealed
statute that was replaced by the Montana Rules of Evidence).
58. The results for the remaining categories of litigants were not statistically
significant. (N !<2.)
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A. Valid Reasons for Overruling.
Some of the Montana Supreme Court's grounds for
overruling are valid. Some are not. Occasionally a conflict
arises between precedents or lines of precedent. The two may
clash in a given case before the court. The outcome of the case
may necessarily extinguish one line of authority.
This
circumstance will compel the court to overrule one set of
authorities.
Past holdings can become obsolete in several ways. Society
may evolve into forms that render the old rule meaningless,
unworkable, or unjust. The passage of time may prove the
fallacy of the underlying principle or the reliability of the facts
on which the old rule was based.59 The law evolves. New duties
may accrue in the law and new immunities may arise as new
facts call for new solutions. Development of the law may render
60
"the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine."
Finally, a rule that read well on paper may, once put into
practice, prove unworkable or specious. These are valid reasons
to overrule precedent. The Montana Supreme Court has had
valid reasons for overruling precedent, although in a minority of
the cases in which it has acted. I now consider them.
1. Actual Conflict Between PriorDecisions.
Conflicts between past decisions or between lines of
authority may arise in several ways. Occasionally it is the fault
of attorneys who fail to advise the court of existing authority.
As a result, the court may decide a case in a way that conflicts
with that authority. This frequently happens in cases in which
one party lacks counsel. The Montana Supreme Court was
presented with that situation in State v. Docken.6 1 Before
Docken, the court had held in an earlier case 62 that when a
suspended sentence was revoked and a second suspended
sentence imposed, the second sentence could not be extended
beyond the term of the first. Some years later, the court decided
58. The results for the remaining categories of litigants were not statistically
significant. (N 2.)
59. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (overruling Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
60. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992).
61. 274 Mont. 296, 908 P.2d 213 (1995) (overruling State v. Downing, 181 Mont. 242,
593 P.2d 43 (1979)).
62. State v. Downing, 181 Mont. 242, 593 P.2d 43 (1979).
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Speldrich v. McCormick, 63 which addressed the same issue.
Speldrich was a prisoner appearing pro se and was not the best
attorney.
Neither he, nor the Assistant Attorney General
opposing him, called Downing to the court's attention. As a
result, Speldrich, although addressing the same kind of facts
presented in Downing, reached the opposite conclusion. Docken
resolved the conflict by overruling Downing and applying
64
Speldrich.
Perceived conflicts between decisions will commonly arise as
the result of dictum in one of the decisions. In those instances
the court can resolve the conflict without overruling the case by
noting that the conflicting language is dictum. For example,
Downing v. Grover65 stated, in dictum, that a prescriptive
66
easement could be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
An earlier decision, Kostbade v. Metier, had addressed the
standard of proof directly. The case held that a prescriptive
67
easement must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.
Kostbade had not been considered by either of the parties in
Downing or by the author of the Downing opinion, since the
standard of proof was not at issue. As night follows day,
68
however, the warring parties in Wareing v. Schreckendgust
each pointed to the standard that favored their argument. The
court relied upon the earlier precedent and overruled Downing.
This was unnecessary, as the court could simply have pointed
out that the Downing language was dictum and was therefore
not precedent.
Authorities not in conflict in earlier cases will clash when
the facts of a particular case bring two principles into opposition.
Such was the case in Hilands Golf Club v. Ashmore. 69 The
Hilands Golf Club had sought judicial review of an adverse
decision by the Montana Human Rights Commission. It served

63. 243 Mont. 238, 794 P.2d 339 (1990).
64. Docken, 274 Mont. at 302-303, 908 P.2d at 216. The Montana Defender Project,
which I directed, represented Docken in this appeal.
65. 237 Mont. 172, 772 P.2d 850 (1989).
66. Downing, 237 Mont. at 175, 772 P.2d at 852. I wonder where Downing found the
standard. The opinion cites to Grimsley v. Estate of Spencer, 206 Mont. 184, 670 P.2d 85
(1983), an action over the prescriptive use of water. Grimsley's only reference to
"preponderance" is actually a reference to the standard of review applied to the trial
court's findings in an equity case. 206 Mont. at 201, 670 P.2d at 94.
67. Kostbade v. Metier, 150 Mont. 139, 143, 432 P.2d 382, 385 (1967).
68. 280 Mont. 196, 930 P.2d 37 (1996).
69. 277 Mont. 324, 922 P.2d 469 (1996).
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a copy of its petition upon Ashmore by mail. Ashmore, relying
upon an earlier administrative law decision, 70 pointed out that a
petition for judicial review was a new proceeding. Therefore, the
petitioner was required to serve the petition and summons on
the opposing party in person in order to perfect its appeal.
Hilands pointed to precedent that arose in the course of a
Montana Administrative Procedure Act appeal, which had held
that mail service, sans summons, would suffice. It also noted
that another decision 71 had approved mail service. The court,
relying in good part on the principle that we ought to keep
things simple so long as a party is not prejudiced, overruled Fife,
72
and approved service by mail.
Conflicts between lines of authority do arise. In some of
these and in other cases, the court acted properly to resolve the
conflicts by overruling earlier decisions. The next significant
area is that of the obsolete rule.
2. The Development of the Law Calls into Question the Validity
of the Past Holding or Experience has Shown the Rule to be
Unworkable or Invalid.
Because Montana is one of fifty state jurisdictions, our
common law does not develop in isolation. Frequently, and more
frequently in the 1990s, the court looked beyond the state line
and considered what was taking place elsewhere. The decisions
of federal courts of appeals and of state appellate courts often
informed the court that a line of Montana authority was
questionable. This category is illustrated by Busta v. Columbus
74
Hospital Corporation73 and Pierce v. ALSC Architects, P.S..
In Busta, the court surveyed the evolution of proximate
cause in Montana, noting that foreseeability had crept into the
definition of proximate cause, mainly by way of the court's
intervening cause jurisprudence. Looking outside the state, the

70. Fife v. Martin, 261 Mont. 471, 863 P.2d 403 (1993).
71. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Dep't of Pub. Serv. Regulation, 260 Mont. 175, 179, 858
P.2d 364, 367 (1993).
72. Hilands, 277 Mont. at 331, 922 P.2d at 473.
73. 276 Mont. 342, 916 P.2d 122 (1996) (overruling Kitchen Krafters, Inc. v. Eastside
Bank of Mont., 242 Mont. 155, 789 P.2d 567 (1990)).
74. 270 Mont. 97, 890 P.2d 1254 (1995) (overruling Harrington v. LaBelle's of Colo.,
Inc., 235 Mont. 80, 765 P.2d 732 (1988), Olson v. Kayser, 161 Mont. 241, 505 P.2d 394
(1973), Hannifin v. Cahill-Mooney Constr. Co., 159 Mont. 413, 498 P.2d 1214 (1972), and
Ulmen v. Schwieger, 92 Mont. 331, 12 P.2d 856 (1932)).
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court also observed that Montana was not alone in this error, 75
nor in recognizing that foreseeability has no role in proximate
cause. Thus, the court properly overruled the line of cases that
imported foreseeability into proximate cause.
Pierce addressed the accepted work defense.7 6 The accepted
work defense provides that a contractor is relieved of liability for
its negligent construction, etc., when the work is accepted by the
owner. Responsibility for a later injury caused by negligent
construction then falls upon the owner. The accepted work
doctrine had been approved, but not applied, in the 1932 case of
Ulmen v. Schweiger.77 Since then, it had been applied in
Montana. The modern rule, now applied in the majority of state
jurisdictions, provides that a contractor remains liable after the
work has been accepted, when injury to a third party from the
contractor's negligence is foreseeable. 78
Pierce adopted the
modern rule, overruling Ulmen and its progeny.
The conclusion that a rule is unworkable is related to a
conclusion that the rule is obsolete, but only in the sense that, in
the second instance, the old rule, once practical, no longer fits.
When a rule is adopted and the court later recognizes that it
simply does not work in practice, the court properly discards it.
But, unlike the obsolescence cases, the court may discard the
rule without relying on the decisions of other jurisdictions. For
example, Leary v. Kelly Pipe Co. 7 9 addressed the question of
peremptory challenges to prospective jurors. Leary held that a
party must show actual prejudice when he objects to a grant of
additional peremptory challenges to a co-party who he believes
is adverse to him. But how, unless you examine a juror's
innermost thoughts, do you prove actual prejudice by the

75. Foreseeability has a role in negligence. It helps determine whether the defendant
owed a duty to the plaintiff. When a reasonable person could foresee that his act or
omission might injure another or his property, the law imposes a duty to refrain from the
act or omission.
Foreseeability does not tell us whether the act or omission of the
defendant was a proximate cause of injury. One can cause injury when the injury would
not be foreseeable.
76. 270 Mont. at 107-108, 916 P.2d at 1260 (addressing question of whether the
defendant could raise the accepted work defense).
77. 92 Mont. 331, 12 P.2d 856 (1932).
78. See Emmanuel S. Tipon, Modern Status of Rules Regarding Tort Liability of
Building or Construction Contractor for Injury or Damage to Third Person Occurring
after Completion and Acceptance of Work; 'Foreseeability"or 'Modern"Rule, 75 A.L.R.5th
413 (2000).
79. 169 Mont. 511, 549 P.2d 813 (1976).
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exclusion of that potential juror? The court considered that
question in King v. Special Resource Management, Inc.,8 0 and
noted that it had previously criticized the rule.8 1 The actual
prejudice rule proved unworkable, therefore, the court overruled
Leary.
The Montana Supreme Court does overrule prior authority
for the right reasons. This occurred, however, in a minority of
the 109 cases listed in the Appendix. More commonly, the court
overruled precedent when it had no need to or when it merely
wished to.
B. Invalid Reasons for Overruling.
Unlike the preceding examples, the court's overruling
practice is overwhelmingly premised on invalid reasons. In
some cases the court perceives a conflict with a line of authority
when the conflict is ethereal. The court also overrules superfluously when the act of overruling is not necessary to the result.
Finally, the largest category is that in which the court believes
the old rule is wrong or a new rule is better. Many of these
cases are premised upon a doctrine of manifest error.
1. Perceived, but, in Fact, Nonexistent Conflict with Another
Line of Authority.
We discover an interesting example of overruling cases
unnecessarily in the "CI-75" case, Marshall v. State ex rel.
Cooney.8 2 Constitutional Initiative 75 proposed referring most
taxes and many fees, and most increases in taxes and fees, to
voters at the election immediately following their enactment by
the local or state legislative body.8 3 Montana voters approved
CI-75 in the 1998 general election. Its opponents immediately
challenged the initiative in court. The opponents contended that
CI-75 violated the single amendment rule of article XIV, section
11, of the Montana Constitution, and this issue formed the heart
of the Marshall dispute. Section 11 provided that if "more than

80. 256 Mont. 367, 846 P.2d 1038 (1993).
81. 256 Mont. at 372, 846 P.2d at 1041 (citing Hunsaker v. Bozeman Deaconess
Found., 179 Mont. 305, 588 P.2d 493 (1978)).
82. 1999 MT 33, 293 Mont. 274, 975 P.2d 325.
83. MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 17 (amended 1998). The text may be found in Appendix
A to the State of Montana's Response to the Original Application for Declaratory
Judgment and Injunctive Relief in Marshall.
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one amendment is submitted at the same election," then each
8' 4
amendment must be prepared so as to be "voted on separately.
In three cases decided between 1906 and 1924,85 the court
had addressed a substantially similar single amendment rule8 6
in different contexts. Suffice it to say that Teague, Hay, and
Cooney concluded that a constitutional amendment, referred to
the voters, that incidentally affected other parts of the
constitution did not violate the single amendment rule. CI-75's
supporters pointed to Teague and its successors and argued that
the court had interpreted the 1889 Constitution's version of the
single subject rule as permitting the survival of CI-75.
In Marshall, the court observed that CI-75 differed
significantly from the constitutional amendments considered in
Teague, Hay, and Cooney.8 7 Unlike the provisions at issue in
Teague, Hay, and Cooney, the court concluded that CI-75
expressly amended at least three separate provisions of the
Montana Constitution.8 8 This meant that Marshall was readily
distinguishable from the earlier three cases and the court duly
89
noted this.
Instead of overruling the three cases, the court could have
distinguished them. After all, they were perfectly good law for
the proposition for which they stood. Nevertheless the court
overruled them, "to the extent that" they were "in conflict" with
the holding in Marshall.90 The opinion does not discuss why the
court did not distinguish the three cases instead of overruling
them.
Marshall ignited a firestorm of criticism directed at the
court and several of its justices.
For years following the
84.

MONT. CONST. art. XIV, § 11.

85. State ex rel. Teague v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 34 Mont. 426, 87 P. 450 (1906); State ex
rel. Hay v. Alderson, 49 Mont. 387, 142 P. 210 (1914); State ex rel. Corry v. Cooney, 70
Mont. 355, 225 P. 1007 (1924).
86. MONT. CONST. art. XIX, § 9 (1889) (amended 1970).
87. Marshall, 23.
88. Id.
20, 28 (Nelson, J., concurring). The Initiative created a new provision that
referred to the state or local electorate most new taxes and many fees or increases in
taxes and fees. It also expressly amended that provision of the constitution that denied
the Governor the power to veto referenda by granting the Governor power to veto tax
increases that were referred to the people for approval. MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 10(1).
The third amendment expressly repealed the legislative and other immunity from suit
provisions of article II, section 18, in cases where public officials violated the provisions
of the initiative.
89. Marshall, 18.
90. Id. 23.
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Marshall decision, an advertisement for the Montana
Conservatives carried on radio stations across Montana pointed
out that the court had gone out of its way to overrule 100 years
of precedent to reach the result that it desired. The desired
result, according to the Montana Conservatives, was to defeat
the will of the people.
As a result of Marshall, the court lost much of its legitimacy
with many Montana citizens. It is true that CI-75's supporters
may have criticized the court had Marshall distinguished rather
than overruled Teague and its friends. But they could not have
accurately claimed that the court went out of its way to strike
down CI-75 by overruling a line of authority.
Marshall was not the only case of its kind. Unlike Great
Britain, Montana enjoys the well established principle that the
court should not emphasize one piece of evidence over another in
a jury trial.91 One way of emphasizing testimony is by sending a
transcript or an audible recording into the jury room. The
principle does not apply to non-testimonial evidence, such as a
surveillance tape. A surveillance tape, even though it may
contain statements by a defendant or by a witness, is not
evidence of testimony, but it is evidence of a transaction.
Therefore, it is allowed in the jury room as the court held in the
92
1987 case of State v. Morse.
In a later decision, State v. Bales,93 a negligent homicide
case, the prosecutor offered an audio tape of a police officer's
interrogation of the defendant. On the tape, the defendant says
that he had a couple of beers and that he "killed his girlfriend."
The tape was admitted and went into the jury room. Bales
contended that the tape was testimonial and that it should not
have gone into the jury room as a piece of evidence. The State
pointed to Morse, which was inapposite, to support its position.
Even though Morse was distinguishable and was good law for its
proposition, the court overruled it "to the extent that" it
conflicted with the court's evidentiary decision.9 4
Oddly,
following these gymnastics, the court concluded that sending the
interrogation tape to the jury room was harmless error and
affirmed the conviction. This makes this case eligible not only
for the perceived conflict category, but also for the next

91. State v. Harris, 247 Mont. 405, 416-18, 808 P.2d 453, 459-60 (1991).
92. 229 Mont. 222, 232-33, 746 P.2d 108, 114-15 (1987).
93. 1999 MT 334, 297 Mont. 402, 994 P.2d 17.
94. Id. 22.
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category-superfluous overruling.
2. Overruling, While Otherwise Reasonable, Appears to Be
Superfluous to the Resolution of Future Cases or to the Issue
Before the Court.
The court occasionally identifies peculiarities in the
opinions of earlier decisions in the course of surveying the law
applicable to the issue at hand. These quirks, whether they are
apparent or potential conflicts between or among statements in
earlier cases, appear to make the court, or at least a majority of
the panel, uneasy. The court has addressed these quirks by
overruling one or more prior decisions. In these cases overruling
was not necessary to the outcome of the issue before the court.
Here are some examples:
In State v. Helfrich,95 the court held unconstitutional the
"criminal defamation" statute. 96 This means, of course, that the
statute could not be enforced. Why, then, would the court
97
overrule the holding in Griffin v. Opinion Publishing Co.,
which stated that truth is an affirmative defense to the charge of
criminal defamation and that "good faith" and "justifiable ends"
also constitute affirmative defenses that must be proven by the
defendant? If the statute is void and no longer enforceable, then
it should not matter whether good faith is an affirmative defense
that must be proven by the defendant or whether absence of
good faith is an element to be proved by the state.
A superfluous overruling occurred in Bush v. Montana
Department of Justice,98 which established the prerequisites for
the giving of a breath alcohol or blood alcohol test under
Montana's implied consent laws. The implied consent statute 99
required that an officer have "reasonable grounds to believe"
that a motorist was driving under the influence, among other
things, and that the motorist be under arrest for DUI before the
officer could demand a breath sample. The court tangled with

95.

277 Mont. 452, 922 P.2d 1159 (1996).

96.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-212 (1995).

97. 114 Mont. 502, 138 P.2d 580 (1943).
98. 1998 MT 270, 291 Mont. 359, 968 P.2d 716 (overruling McCullugh v. State, 259
Mont. 406, 856 P.2d 958 (1993), Boland v. State, 242 Mont. 520, 792 P.2d 1 (1990),
Gebhardt v. State, 238 Mont. 90, 775 P.2d 1261 (1989), and Suspension of Driver's
License of Blake, 220 Mont. 27, 712 P.2d 1338 (1986)).
99.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-402 (1997).
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two lines of cases. One line equated "reasonable grounds to
believe" with a probable cause standard. 10 0 The other line
equated it with the lesser "particularized suspicion" standard.101
The court adopted the particularized suspicion standard and
overruled those cases that required probable cause. Nevertheless it went on to note that the implied consent statute also
required that the motorist be under arrest before a breath
sample could be demanded. The prerequisite for arrest is...
probable cause! The court thus held that probable cause is a
10 2
prerequisite to demanding a breath sample.
These overrulings were superfluous.
In Helfrich, the
statute having been struck down, the question of the burden of
proof was not material to the decision. The Helfrich holding will
give succor to a future lawyer seeking support for a claim that
the plaintiff bears the burden of proving absence of good faith in
a civil libel action. The reasonable suspicion/probable cause
issue continues to give the court difficulty in other areas, and
Bush adds unnecessarily to the confusion. Perhaps some future
panel will overrule these cases "to the extent that .... "
3. Cases Overruled UnnecessarilyBecause the Legislature or the
1972 ConstitutionHas "Overruled"the EarlierCase.
Some defenders of the court have suggested that the
adoption of the 1972 Constitution explains the high rate of
overruling cases.103 We now come directly to that claim. The
court has overruled precedent because of changes in written law,
but only in five cases.10 4 Of these five, only two involved a
10 5
change between the 1889 and 1972 Constitutions.
If the legislature or the Constitutional Convention has
rewritten the law, why is it necessary to overrule a case that
interpreted the now repealed or amended provision?
The

100. See Bush, 9.
101. Id.
102. Id.
22.
Probable cause after Bush is also a prerequisite to the other
subdivisions of Montana Code Annotated section 61-8-402.
103. See supra text pp. 61-62.
104. See Marshall v. State ex rel. Cooney, 1999 MT 33, 293 Mont. 274, 975 P.2d 325;
Town Pump, Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 1998 MT 294, 292 Mont. 6, 971 P.2d 349; State v.
Lawrence, 285 Mont. 140, 948 P.2d 186 (1997); State v. Kuntz, 265 Mont. 253, 875 P.2d
1034 (1994); Talley v. Flathead Valley Cmty. Coll., 259 Mont. 479, 857 P.2d 701 (1993).
105. Marshall, 1999 MT 33, 293 Mont. 274, 975 P.2d 325; Town Pump, Inc., 1998 MT
294, 292 Mont. 6, 971 P.2d 349 (1998) (overruling State v. Haswell, 147 Mont. 492, 414
P.2d 652 (1966)).
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legislature has done the overruling for us. The situation then
calls for nothing more than to point out that the law has
changed. The precedent remains good authority for the former
legislative act-the former act simply is no longer in effect.
For example, Teamsters v. Cascade County School District
No. 1106 construed the Code's definition of "school teacher" to
include teachers in the higher education system. Two decades
later, in Talley v. Flathead Valley Community College,10 7 a
community college instructor, relying on Teamsters, claimed
that he had been tenured under the rules governing school
teachers. The College quickly pointed out the fact that the
higher education code had been amended. Community college
instructors were now expressly included under the new code,
and not under any common law, primary, or secondary school
definition of teacher. The College was right, but the court found
it necessary to overrule Teamsters.108 The mischief will appear
if the legislature later amends the statute to return to the
Teamsters definition of "teacher."
4. The Old Rule Was Wrong or a New Rule Is Better.
Most frequently, the Montana Supreme Court panel of the
1990s disagreed with a holding of one of its predecessors. This
practice is the greatest source of instability in the court's
jurisprudence.
The court ratcheted a rule one way, then
another, sometimes seemingly to fit the facts or the result. In
doing so, it invited mischief beyond instability-the kind of
mischief that comes from an untried rule. One such case is
State v. Lane.10 9
When a defendant is sentenced for a crime, the sentence is
audibly pronounced from the bench and is then reduced to
writing.
Occasionally the sentencing judge would omit a
provision from the sentence and call the defendant back into
court to correct the omission. Defendants objected to this

106. 162 Mont. 277, 511 P.2d 339 (1973).
107. 259 Mont. 479, 857 P.2d 701 (1993).
108. Talley, 259 Mont. at 485, 857 P.2d at 704 (failing to explain why overruling was
necessary when the legislature had already done it).
109. State v. Lane, 1998 MT 76, 288 Mont. 286, 957 P.2d 9 (overruling State v,
Graveley, 275 Mont. 519, 915 P.2d 184 (1996), State v. Mason, 253 Mont. 419, 833 P.2d
1058 (1992), State v. Wirtala, 231 Mont. 264, 752 P.2d 177 (1988), and State v. Enfinger,
222 Mont. 438, 722 P.2d 1170 (1986)).
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process on double jeopardy grounds when the second sentence
was more severe, claiming that the judge could not increase a
sentence once it had been imposed.
A mixture of conflicting statements in the Code was one
source of confusion over the judge's power. According to the
Code, a "sentence" is a judicial disposition of a criminal case
following conviction. 110 A "judgment," however, is the court's
adjudication of guilt and the sentence pronounced by the
court."'
The Code then declares that a sentence must be
rendered in open court' 12 and the defendant must be present
when this is done.'1 3 In other words, the sentence is typically
audible. Although the Code demands a judgment be rendered in
open court, 1 4 the Code also demands that the judgment be
signed and entered on the record. 115 As a result, the judgment,
which sets out the adjudication of guilt and sets forth the
sentence, is both audible and written.
In Enfinger, the defendant complained on appeal because
the district court orally sentenced him, then called him back and
imposed a more severe sentence." 6 The court held that
Enfinger's sentence was not final until it was filed, that is, until
it was reduced to writing."17 The court noted that this rule was
"well-established.""118
Because the sentence was not final,
defendants were not put twice in jeopardy by the second
imposition of sentence. Wirtala and Mason were decided on
similar facts and followed Enfinger." 9
Graveley120 presented different facts. At his sentencing
hearing, Gravely was sentenced to serve forty years in the
custody of the Department of Corrections. The lower court
orally declared that ten of those years were to be spent "in a

110.
111.
112.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-1-202(25) (1999).
Id. § 46-1-202(10).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-115 (1999).

113.

MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-16-121(1) to -123 (1999).

114. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-102(1) (1999).
"judgment" with "sentence" in this provision.
115.

It seems the legislature conflated

MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-116 (1999).

116. Enfinger, 222 Mont. at 444, 722 P.2d at 1174.
117. Enfinger, 222 Mont. at 444, 722 P.2d at 1174.
118. Enfinger, 222 Mont. at 444, 722 P.2d at 1174 (quoting State v. Diaz, 673 P.2d 501,
502 (N.M. 1983)).
119. Wirtala, 231 Mont. at 270, 752 P.2d at 181; Mason, 253 Mont. at 425, 833 P.2d at
1061-62.
120. 275 Mont. 519, 915 P.2d 184 (1996).
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prison environment. '121 The sentence was imposed in open court
and the defendant was hauled off to the State Prison. After his
arrival he discovered that the sentence recited in his written
judgment provided that he would be committed to the custody of
the Department of Corrections for a period of forty years,
omitting the ten-year "prison environment" condition.
He
complained, thinking apparently that under the oral
pronouncement he would spend only ten years in prison. He
contended that the more severe sentence could not be imposed
without returning him to open court. The court concluded,
however, that the difference favored the defendant (he could
spend less than ten years in a prison environment) and affirmed
the lower court. Justice Leaphart dissented, contending that the
instant the defendant was removed from the court room he
began serving the oral sentence. 122 Anything imposed later put
the defendant twice in jeopardy. 123
Lane 24 completed the possible combinations of written and
oral sentences.
In Lane's case, the oral sentence was
pronounced in open court in the presence of the defendant. The
written sentence, however, turned out to be much more
favorable to him. One year after the written sentence had been
signed, the sentencing judge entered a nunc pro tunc order that
conformed the written judgment to the more severe, audible,
version.125 Lane, who had a dozen years of precedent on his
side, not surprisingly argued that the first written judgment was
final and could not be altered. Not so, said the court. The
sentence imposed in open court now "controls" because the
defendant has a right to be present when sentence is imposed.126
127
Enfinger, Wirtala, Mason, and Graveley were overruled.
One thing binds all five cases: the criminal defendant came
up on the short end each time. In each, the rule was adopted,
tweaked, or overruled, preserving a sentence that fell more
heavily on the appealing defendant. This was not purposeful,
but you cannot persuade these prisoners that the decisions were

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Gravely, 275 Mont. at 522, 915 P.2d at 186.
Gravely, 275 Mont. at 526, 915 P.2d at 189.
Gravely, 275 Mont. at 526, 915 P.2d at 189.
1998 MT 76, 288 Mont. 286, 957 P.2d 9.
Id.
10.
Id. 48.
Id.
40, 41.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/3

38

2004

STARE
DECISIS
IN inMONTANA
Renz:
Stare Decisis
Montana

not designed to keep them in prison longer.
When the court attempted to craft the "right" rule-without
asking whether the old rule was working well-it created new
mischief. Enfinger, Wirtala, and Mason did not conflict with
Lane. The court premised the Lane result on the defendant's
right of confrontation, that is, his right to be present at his
sentencing. Remember, in all three of the prior cases, the
defendant was returned to court for imposition of the corrected
oral sentence.
Lane reopens the question that Enfinger,
Wirtala, and Mason had answered affirmatively. Can a district
judge recall a defendant on the same day and, in open court,
orally "correct" an oral sentence?
Other mischief followed. Formerly the judgment was final
when "signed and entered on the record. ' 128 In his concurring
opinion, Justice Nelson pointed out that the court's holding in
Lane left the time of finality up in the air. 129 Lane, as a result,
occasioned amendments to Montana Rule of Appellate
Procedure 5(b), and to Montana Code Annotated section 46-18116. Rule 5(b) specifically referenced the entry of judgment
referred to in Montana Code Annotated section 46-18-116, and
treated notices of appeal filed between the time of the oral
pronouncement of sentence and the entry of judgment as having
been filed on the day judgment was entered. The court revised
Rule 5(b) to provide that the time for filing a notice of appeal ran
from the entry of the written judgment.
The legislature
corrected the damage to section 46-18-117 by repealing it and
amending section 46-18-116.130 Section 46-18-116 now provides
that a written sentence that differs from the oral may be
corrected on request filed within 120 days of the filing of the
written judgment. 131 It also provides, however, that the court
may correct a "factually erroneous sentence or judgment at any
time."13 2 We do not know yet whether a "factually erroneous"
sentence is one that differs from what the sentencing judge
intended.
In this same category ("The Old Rule Was Wrong or a New
Rule Is Better") the court has a habit of ignoring a fundamental

128.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-116 (1999). See MONT. R. APP. P. 5(b) (1999) (providing

that an appeal must be taken within sixty days of entry of judgment).
129. Lane, 59.
130. 2001 Mont. Laws 321.
131.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-116(2) (2001).

132.

Id. § 46-18-116(3).
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principle: that the legislature's acquiescence in a supreme
court's interpretation of a statute is presumptive evidence of the
correctness of the construction. 133 One of the purposes of
34 It is
statutory construction is to create certainty in the law.
the antithesis of stability when an appellate court adopts one
construction of a statute and a later panel, merely by exercising
greater wisdom than the first, adopts an opposite construction.
135
Such an approach is not branch-respecting. State v. Strizich
illustrates the problem.
Anyone who has practiced in the criminal law arena knows
the difference between a motion and order to suppress, and a
motion and order in limine. An order to suppress addresses a
claim that the state's officers obtained physical evidence or a
defendant's statement by violating the law. An order in limine,
in contrast, is a pretrial order that typically applies the rules of
evidence and determines the admissibility of legally obtained
evidence.
In Montana, the legislature has limited the state's ability to
appeal the results of criminal cases.1 36 Among other things, the
state may appeal from "any court order" "suppressing
evidence"'137 or "suppressing a confession or admission."1 38 Such
appeals are taken before trial-that is, before jeopardy attaches
to the defendant.
In State v. Carney,139 the court held that rulings on the
admissibility of evidence, made during trial, could not be
appealed by the State. Jeopardy had attached, and permitting
the state to appeal an evidentiary ruling would expose the
defendant to multiple trials-forbidden by double jeopardy
clauses of the Montana and United States Constitutions. In
State v. Yarns and State v. T. W, the court concluded that double
jeopardy was not a concern when evidentiary rulings were made
133. State v. Snider, 168 Mont. 220, 226, 541 P.2d 1204, 1208 (1975); State ex rel.
Roeder v. State Bd. of Equalization, 133 Mont. 393, 400, 324 P.2d 1057, 1061 (1958); 2B
SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 49.10 (6th ed. 2000).
134. Quentin Johnstone, An Evaluation of the Rules of Statutory Construction, 3 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1954).
135. State v. Strizich, 286 Mont. 1, 952 P.2d 1365 (1997) (overruling State v. Yarns,
252 Mont. 45, 826 P.2d 543 (1992), and State v. T.W., 220 Mont. 280, 715 P.2d 428
(1986)).
136. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-20.103 (2001).
137. Id. § 46-20-103(2)(e).
138. Id. § 46-20-103(2)().
139. 219 Mont. 412, 714 P.2d 532 (1986).
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in the context of a pretrial order granting or denying a motion in
limine. In such cases the order was a pre-trial order and
jeopardy had not attached because the appeal was filed before
the trial.
Like a pretrial order suppressing evidence on
constitutional grounds, an appeal from the order was permitted
by Montana Code Annotated section 46-20-103(2)(e), the statute
that speaks of appeals from orders "suppressing" evidence.
In 1991, five years after T.W., the legislature overhauled
Title 46, the criminal procedure code. 140 It left Montana Code
Annotated section 46-20-103(2)(e) unchanged, leading to the conclusion that the legislature approved the court's interpretation
of the statute. The following year Yarns approved T. W.141
In Strizich, the defendant asked the court to reconsider its
holdings in T.W. and Yarns. Strizich presented a minor twist.
In Strizich the State had appealed from City Court to the
District Court after the City Court had issued an adverse order
governing the admissibility of evidence. All such appeals result
in a trial de novo in the district court.
Notably, nothing was called to the Strizich Court's attention
that was not available to the T. W and Yarns panels. The court
looked at decisions from other jurisdictions that distinguished
suppression orders from orders in limine. It considered policy
claims that speculated that permitting appeals of pretrial orders
in limine, "would require that this court micro-manage the
discretionary functions of trial courts"1 42 and "would allow the
State to avoid justice court or city court jurisdiction altogether
anytime it decides it would be tactically advantageous to do
so.143 It concluded, "that certainly was not the intent of the
Legislature when it authorized appeals based on the
4suppression of evidence.'1' 44 T. W and Yarns are overruled.
By the time Strizich was decided, the construction of the
statute had been settled for over a decade. The Strizich Court
was not presented with evidence or information that demonstrated that the expanded rule had in fact compelled the court to
"micro-manage." No one had called to the court's attention an
abuse of the expanded power to appeal. The court observed that
the prosecution might avoid city or justice court jurisdiction

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

1991 Mont. Laws 3011.
Yarns, 252 Mont. at 50, 862 P.2d at 546.
Strizich, 286 Mont. at 10, 952 P.2d at 1371.
Strizich, 286 Mont. at 10, 952 P.2d at 1371.
Strizich, 286 Mont. at 10, 952 P.2d at 1371.
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when it was tactically advantageous to do so. However, despite
ten years' experience with the rule, the court did not conclude
that prosecutors had regularly avoided city or justice court
jurisdiction by that device, even though they may have done so
in Strizich. In any event, the court's concern about prosecutors
avoiding city or justice court jurisdiction was equally applicable
to motions to suppress, filing of which was required before
trial. 14 5 A pretrial motion in limine, in contrast, is not required
to preserve the admissibility issue. 146
In many cases a
defendant could defeat the prosecution's expanded power to
appeal simply by raising the evidentiary objection during trial,
after jeopardy had attached.
The flavor of Strizich pervades nearly all of the court's "The
Old Rule Was Wrong or a New Rule Is Better" jurisprudence and
much of its overruling jurisprudence. On reading Strizich, we
realize that the court feels free to second-guess its predecessors.
As it did in Strizich, the court has repeatedly ignored the
legislature's acquiescence in long-standing statutory construction, seemingly substituting its wisdom for the wisdom of
earlier Montana Supreme Courts and for the wisdom of
members of dozens of legislative sessions.
Rasmussen v. Lee147 offers another example. For over fifty
years, Montana Code Annotated section 70-27-108(2) and its
R.C.M. predecessor permitted an agricultural tenant to holdover
for an additional year when the landlord did not demand
1 48
possession within sixty days after expiration of the lease term.
The Hamilton-Holliday line of cases interpreted and applied
this provision to holdovers without regard to whether the term49
ination was for non-payment of rent or for other reasons.'

145.

See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-13-101(1) (1997).

146.

See MONT. R. EVID. 103(a)(1); State v. Fuhrman, 278 Mont. 396, 402-403, 925 P.2d

1162, 1165 (1996), overruled on other grounds by State v. Van Kirk, 2001 MT 184, 306
Mont. 215, 32 P.3d 735 (holding that a motion in limine may be used to preserve
evidentiary issue without objection at trial).
147. Rasmussen v. Lee, 276 Mont. 84, 916 P.2d 98 (1996) (overruling Holliday Land &
Livestock Co. v. Pierce, 174 Mont. 393, 571 P.2d 93 (1977), Pipkin v. Connolly, 167 Mont.
284, 538 P.2d 347 (1975), Miller v. Meredith, 149 Mont. 125, 423 P.2d 595 (1967),
Kenfield v. Curry, 145 Mont. 174, 399 P.2d 999 (1965), Enott v. Hinkle, 140 Mont. 206,
369 P.2d 413 (1962), and Hamilton v. Rock, 121 Mont. 245, 191 P.2d 663 (1948)).
148.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-27-108(2) (1996); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 93-9703 (1947).

149. Holliday, 174 Mont. at 396, 571 P.2d at 95; Pipkin, 167 Mont. at 290, 538 P.2d at
349-350; Miller, 149 Mont. at 129, 423 P.2d at 597; Kenfield, 145 Mont. at 178, 399 P.2d
at 1002; Enott, 140 Mont. at 209, 369 P.2d at 415; Hamilton, 121 Mont. at 248, 191 P.2d
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Nevertheless, in Rasmussen, the court reinterpreted the statute,
despite a half-century of legislative acquiescence in the
interpretation, and held that this provision applies only where
the termination is for non-payment of rent.
The goal of stability in the law was fostered by the
Hamilton-Holliday line of cases. For fifty years, tenants and
landlords knew what their respective rights and interests were
upon termination of the lease. Agricultural leases could be
written in reliance upon a settled interpretation of the statute.
Rasumussen put existing leases in jeopardy. If that was not
enough, Rasmussen was distinguishable on its facts from its
predecessors.
Lane, Strizich, and Rasmussen illustrate several points. In
each of these cases, as in all forty-seven decisions in which the
court discarded a rule it did not like, the court second-guessed
the analysis or reasoning of those who had gone before it and
reached a different conclusion. In each case the rule had been
long established. Additionally, the rule appeared to be working
well. Finally, in those cases that questioned the correctness of
the original statutory interpretation, the legislature had
acquiesced in the statutory interpretation.
This last point cannot be emphasized enough. Of the court's
109 decisions overruling precedent, forty-eight involved
questions of statutory interpretation or the application of a
statute that had been resolved by the Montana Supreme Court
in the past.150
At some point, and especially where the
legislature did not act to overrule the court's interpretation,
parties are entitled to rely upon the court's statutory
construction.
When a court does not honor a settled construction simply because it disagrees with it, it defeats predictability. Businesses cannot feel confident in their business
decisions. Lawyers cannot give reliable advice. Individuals
cannot act secure in the belief that their actions comply with the
law. After all, the law's interpretation may change next week.
The court often rationalized its action by describing the
earlier decision as "manifestly wrong." In the following section,
I discuss the problem with the court's "manifest error" principle.
The problem is that there is no manifest error principle.

at 665.
150. See supra p. 63.
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VII. MANIFEST ERROR?

When the court has concluded that an earlier decision was
wrong or that another rule is better, it has frequently claimed
that overruling was proper because the prior decision was
"manifestly wrong. ' 15 1 A review of the decisions in this area
reveal that the court's manifest error jurisprudence was not
premised upon a principle that it consistently applied.
Nevertheless when we examine the opinions that form the
foundation of the court's asserted basis for its power to overrule
prior decisions that are "manifestly wrong," a principle emerges.
It is not, however, employed by today's court. We begin with
State ex rel. Peery v. District Court,1 52 to which the current court
has pointed as its authority for overruling a decision that is
manifestly wrong. Peery addressed the question of whether
stare decisis directs the court's interpretation of a constitutional
provision when the court is satisfied that the interpretation was
"manifestly wrong." 153 Peery relied upon statements from earlier
Montana Supreme Court decisions that said the same thing:
"The rule of stare decisis will not prevail where it is
demonstrably made to appear that the construction placed upon
the constitutional provision in the former decision is manifestly
wrong."1 54 This, of course, is no principle at all. It is, rather, a
self-interested grant of power, a lesser degree of l
Htat, c'est moi.
Among the cases that Peery cites, only State ex rel. Sparling
applied this statement in a manner that explains it.
State ex rel. Sparling and State ex rel. Kain considered two
statutes adopted to address the Great Depression. 155 The
legislature had sought to grant relief to distressed landowners
who, by reason of drought and the economic times, were unable
to pay their property taxes. Kain applied an earlier decision,
Sanderson v. Bateman,156 which had struck down a similar law
in 1927.157 The Sanderson case addressed a 1923 legislative act
151. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
152. 145 Mont. 287, 400 P.2d 648 (1965).
153. Peery, 145 Mont. at 310, 400 P.2d at 660.
154. State ex rel. Sparling v. Hitsman, 99 Mont. 521, 525, 44 P.2d 747, 749 (1935). See
also State ex rel. Kain v. Fischl, 94 Mont. 92, 97, 20 P.2d 1057, 1059 (1933) (per curiam).
155. 1933 Mont. Laws 61; 1935 Mont. Laws 133.
156. 78 Mont. 235, 253 P. 1100 (1927).
157. Because of drought and the post-World War I crash in grain prices, the
Depression savaged Montana years before it began in the rest of the country. See
JOSEPH KINSEY HOWARD, MONTANA: HIGH, WIDE, AND HANDSOME 218-224 (1943).
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that permitted delinquent property tax payers to redeem their
property from the county by paying the past due taxes plus
seven percent, even if interest on the past due taxes exceeded
seven percent. The court applied a constitutional provision that
prohibited the legislature from transferring or extinguishing
obligations or liabilities to the state or local governments 158 and
struck down the law. In Kain, the court concluded that the 1933
redemption act was practically indistinguishable from the 1923
version. It applied the rule of stare decisis and voided the 1933
act on the same grounds as Sanderson.159 The Sparling Court,
two years later, considered a yet more generous version of the
1933 law that permitted the landowner to tender the past due
taxes, without payment of any interest or penalties. 6 0 The
Sparling Court, however, recognized the breadth and depth of
the emergency and concluded that it was not bound by stare
decisis.16 1 The court overruled Kain and Sanderson on "manifest
error" grounds-concluding that interest and penalties were not
the obligations and liabilities to which the constitution referred.
The Sparling Court noted the rule that stare decisis should
apply unless "it is demonstrably made to appear that the
[earlier] construction ... is manifestly wrong."'162 The Kain
Court had observed that a constitutional interpretation at issue
in the case should stand, absent "cogent reasons to the
contrary." 163 In other words, the "manifest error" doctrine
should be applied conservatively. Under the Sparling/Kain
principle, a later appellate court's view that an earlier court's
interpretation contained an error, even an apparent error,
should not result in overruling in the absence of other, cogent
reasons.
The court went on to describe cogent reasons to overrule
6 4 Its description of these reasons adds to
Kain and Sanderson.1
this conservative view of manifest error.
Remember, the
Sparling Court concluded that interest and penalties were not
the obligations and liabilities the constitution referred to,

158.

MONT. CONST. art. V, § 39 (1889).

159. Kain, 94 Mont. at 97, 20 P.2d at 1059.
160. 99 Mont. at 523, 44 P.2d at 748; 1935 Mont. Laws 133.
161. Sparling,99 Mont. at 525-26, 44 P.2d at 749.
162. Sparling,99 Mont. at 525, 44 P.2d at 749 (citing Kain, 94 Mont. at 97, 20 P.2d at
1059).

163. Kain, 94 Mont. at 97, 20 P.2d at 1059.
164. Sparling,99 Mont. at 527-30, 44 P.2d at 750-751.
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contrary to Kain and Bateman.' 65
In the course of addressing its departure, the court noted
that the precedents did not "relate to titles 'or involve vested
rights, and do not establish rules of trade, property, or contract,
etc." 16 6 Overruling the precedents would therefore not alter
rules upon which people had relied and would not affect vested
rights. Second, the court observed that the development of the
law had called into question the validity of Sanderson and Kain.
Other states had altered their own precedents with respect to
similar statutes or had reached different conclusions. 167 With
respect to Sanderson's and Kain's definition of "penalty," the
court noted disagreements in other Montana cases. 168 Finally,
169
the court observed that an emergency had been "established."
The court concluded that these were cogent reasons to overrule
the prior decisions.
This highlights the difference between the "manifest error"
doctrine employed by the Montana Supreme Court today and
the doctrine upon which the court purports to draw. The
current doctrine suffers from the mark of Kain. Today's doctrine
is best described as error that is manifest whenever a majority
of the court says it is. The source of the doctrine is different.
The original "manifest error" doctrine recognized that, although
an earlier opinion may have contained errors of reasoning or
analysis, and a later court may recognize an error, that is not
necessarily a reason for the later court to overrule the prior case.
Prudence is called for. If the "erroneous" rule is of the kind that
people rely upon in the conduct of their affairs, then it especially
should not be altered absent "cogent reasons." 170 If development
of the law, changes in society, or changes in the context in which
the rule operated call into question the validity of the old rule, it
may be overruled.
It is reasonable to conclude that the court need not be
convinced that the rule is outdated or questionable. If the rule
was in error in the beginning, the court could overrule it more
freely, provided it or a similar rule had been questioned by other
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
alone
170.

Sparling,99 Mont. at 530, 44 P.2d at 751.
Sparling,99 Mont. at 525, 44 P.2d at 749.
Sparling,99 Mont. at 526, 44 P.2d at 749.
Sparling,99 Mont. at 528, 44 P.2d at 750.
Sparling, 99 Mont. at 526, 44 P.2d at 750 (noting, however, that an emergency
would not warrant overruling precedent).
Kain, 94 Mont. at 97, 20 P.2d at 1059.
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jurisdictions or so long as experience suggested it was less
functional than first thought. These should not be theoretical
observations, like the kind we see in Strizich, but practical
determinations made on information in the briefs, or, if
necessary, on the basis of information provided in a friend of the
court brief.
VIII. TOWARD A PRINCIPLED APPROACH To STARE DECISIS
The current Montana Supreme Court lacks a consistent
approach to stare decisis.
The court overrules cases unnecessarily, injuring the legitimacy of the institution. The court
overrules cases when it dislikes long established rules, rules of
recent vintage, or when it disagrees with the thinking of its
predecessors. This fosters instability in the law. The court
should adopt a more principled and conservative approach.
We must consider another matter. To some degree, albeit
not consciously, the Montana Supreme Court has followed a civil
law model. 171 In those cases categorized as "The Old Rule was
Wrong or the New Rule is Better," the court has considered either
a Restatement, 172 another common law rule, 173 a statute that
has codified the common law, 174 a statute that has replaced the
common law,1 75 or it has applied a statute differently than did a
prior court.' 76 In these cases, the court appears to apply the

171. This realization is not far-fetched.
In 1931, Cambridge's Professor Arthur
Goodhart predicted:
[I]n no distant time the American doctrine will approximate to that of the civil
law. This will be due in large part to five reasons: (1) the uncontrollable flood
of American decisions, (2) the predominant position of constitutional questions
in American law, (3) the American need for flexibility in legal development, (4)
the method of teaching in the American law schools, and (5) the restatement of
the law by the American Law Institute.
ARTHUR L. GOODHART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COMMON LAW 65 (1931).
172.

Beckman v. Butte-Silver Bow County, 2000 MT 112, 299 Mont. 389, 1 P.3d 348

(applying RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 414, 416, 427); Richardson v. Corvallis
Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 286 Mont. 309, 950 P.2d 748 (1997) (applying RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 343(A)(1)).
173. An example of a such a common law rule is the "fence out" rule, overruled in
Larson-Murphy v. Steiner, 2000 MT 334, 303 Mont. 96, 15 P.3d 1205.
174. See Whidden v. John S. Nerison, Inc., 1999 MT 10, 294 Mont. 346, 981 P.2d 271
(concluding that the "at will" doctrine has been repealed by the Wrongful Discharge Act).
175. Workers' compensation legislation has replaced the common law, for example.
See Sherner v. Conoco, Inc., 2000 MT 50, 298 Mont. 401, 995 P.2d 990 (reinterpreting the
intentional injury exception to workers' compensation's exclusive remedy).
176. See Albright v. State, 281 Mont. 196, 933 P.2d 815 (1997) (interpreting notice
rules for property tax assessments).
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statute or Restatement provision in order to achieve a just
result. This is typical of a civil law tradition where the judge's
"function is merely to find the right legislative provision, couple
it with the fact situation, and bless the solution that is more or
less automatically produced from the union." 17 7 A statute is
thus interpreted, but no single or binding interpretation is
necessarily followed or employed. 178 As a result, in a civil law
jurisdiction, the meaning and application of a statute may
change to fit new circumstances even if the text of the statute
1 79
does not change.
I doubt that the court has adopted a civil law approach
consciously, although this pattern appears in its decisions.
Nevertheless, the court has not expressed a sentiment to follow
a civil law tradition, so I will turn to what I think is necessary to
correct the current court's approach to stare decisis.
A principled approach should begin with the values that are
advanced by a doctrine of stare decisis. These include predictability, fairness, efficiency, institutional integrity, and
respect for the legislative branch.18 0 When a court considers
overruling precedent, it should first weigh these values.
What impact will overruling have on predictability and
stability of social relations? In the areas of contracts, wills and
estates, commercial dealings, and property, predictability is
highly important. Many rely upon existing law when preparing
a document that describes future relations. Interpretations of
the constitution ought also to remain stable because the
constitution is the fundamental law. Instability in constitutional interpretation invites instability in the rules that are
extrapolated from the constitution.
Long-standing interpretations of a statute ought to remain
undisturbed out of respect for the legislative branch. One might
argue that because Montana elects its judges, the act of
overruling an earlier interpretation of a statute is less
antidemocratic. However, we do not elect judges to make or
remake state policy outside the area of the common law. The
judicial power is the power to decide disputes and to make

177.

JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 36 (Stanford Univ. Press, 2d

ed. 1985).
178. Id. at 45-46.
179. Id. at 47.
180. See supra Part II.
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binding orders. 181 When a statute has received an authoritative
construction from an earlier Montana Supreme Court, there is
no dispute over the interpretation to decide. When a court
overrules its earlier construction of a statute because it now
questions the earlier reasoning, it is not deciding-it is
legislating. It treats precedent as if it were the property of the
court to be disposed of freely. Precedent, however, is public
property.
When authorities appear to be in conflict, the court should
prefer distinguishing them to overruling them.
Precedent
should be overruled when the conflict between two lines of
authority cannot be reconciled. Whenever the court overrules a
prior decision, "to the extent that. . . ," we may conclude that
the prior case may be distinguished.
The court should develop a principled manifest error
doctrine. It should not be enough for a majority of the court's
members to question the reasoning of an earlier panel, even if it
may be fairly characterized as "wrong."182 A principled manifest
error doctrine will weigh the values of stare decisis when
members of the court think the precedent was incorrectly
decided. Before a "wrong" decision is overruled, it should also be
in disrepair, it should have been regularly disregarded, or it
should have fallen into disrespect. It should be seen as working
unfavorably before it is overruled.1 83 State ex rel. Sparling offers
an example of this approach.
But this is not really a manifest error doctrine. It is a
doctrine of flexible stare decisis, a doctrine that American
jurisdictions have tended towards throughout the Twentieth
Century. So, in the end, it is not necessary that the prior court
be wrong. It is only necessary for the rule to be flawed in
application. In that case, and I draw the line at reinterpreting
an act of the legislature, the court should not hesitate to discard
it.

181. See State ex rel. Bennett v. Bonner, 123 Mont. 414, 425, 214 P.2d 747, 753 (1950).
182. See supra Part VI(B)(4). It is fair to say the reasoning of the cases overruled in
Strizich were "wrong," but the resulting rule worked well enough in practice. See
Monaghan, supra note 11, at 762 ("Whether a precedent is seen as clearly wrong is often
a function of the judge's self-confidence more than of any objective fact.").
183. See HENRY AGARD WALLACE, WHOSE CONSTITUTION?, in STILL LAW OF THE LAND?:
ESSAYS ON CHANGING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION 10 (Lissa Roche ed.,
1987).
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CONCLUSION

Between 1991 and 2000, the Montana Supreme Court
overruled cases at an unprecedented rate. No other state court
took a similar approach. In no other decade was the Montana
Supreme Court as active.
Many may disagree with my categorization of these cases.
It is perfectly arguable that some decisions I find justifiable are
not, and that some decisions I criticize are justifiable. Any
number of decisions could fall into more than one category.
Nevertheless, the pattern illustrates something. Moving a
case here or changing the category of one or two there does not
alter the picture.
The court was active and was often
irrationally active. If we set aside a tendency to act in a civil
law tradition, the court's activity can be explained only by a lack
of adherence to principle when overruling its precedent. By
remembering and applying the values of stare decisis, the court
may return predictability to Montana's jurisprudence.

EPILOGUE

A review of the Montana Supreme Court's approach to
precedent during 1991-2000 remains relevant today. In the
three years that have passed since the end of 2000, the Montana
Supreme Court has overruled its precedent in thirty-two cases, a
rate similar to that of 1991-2000.
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APPENDIX A
1. Sleath v. West Mont Home Health Servs., Inc., 2000 MT 381, 304 Mont. 1, 16
P.3d 1042 (overruling McAlpine v. Rhone-Poulenc Ag. Co., 285 Mont. 224, 947 P.2d 474
(1997)).
2. Hartle v. Nelson, 2000 MT 356, 303 Mont. 264, 15 P.3d 484 (overruling McDonald
v. Mont. Wood Co., 14 Mont. 88, 35 P. 668 (1894)).
3. Larson-Murphy v. Steiner, 2000 MT 334, 303 Mont. 96, 15 P.3d 1205 (overruling
Indendi v. Workman, 272 Mont. 64, 899 P.2d 1085 (1995) (for three separate
propositions, although I don't think Indendi is overruled); Yager v. Deane, 258 Mont.
453, 853 P.2d 1214 (1993); Williams v. Selstad, 235 Mont. 137, 766 P.2d 247 (1988);
State ex rel. Martin v. Finley, 227 Mont. 242, 738 P.2d 497 (1987); Siegfried v. Atchison,
219 Mont. 14, 709 P.2d 1006 (1985); Ambrogini v. Todd, 197 Mont. 111, 642 P.2d 1013
(1982); Sanders v. Mount Haggin Livestock Co., 160 Mont. 73, 500 P.2d 397 (1972);
Jenkins v. Valley Garden Ranch, Inc., 151 Mont. 463, 443 P.2d 753 (1968); Bartsch v.
Irvine Co., 149 Mont. 405, 427 P.2d 302 (1967)).
4. Chandler v. Mahoney, 2000 MT 294, 302 Mont. 309, 18 P.3d 312 (overruling State
v. Pendergrass, 281 Mont. 129, 932 P.2d 1056 (1997)).
5. Huether v. Dist. Court, 2000 MT 158, 300 Mont. 212, 4 P.3d 1193 (overruling
Sistok v. Kalispell Reg'l Hosp., 251 Mont. 38, 823 P.2d 251 (1991)).
6. Dobrocke v. City of Columbia Falls, 2000 MT 179, 300 Mont. 348, 8 P.3d 71
(overruling Buck v. State, 222 Mont. 423, 723 P.2d 210 (1986), and, impliedly, Sullivan v.
City of Butte, 104 Mont. 225, 65 P.2d 1175 (1937)).
7. Watters v. Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co., 2000 MT 150, 300 Mont. 91, 3 P.3d 626
(overruling Juedeman v. Nat'l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co., 253 Mont. 278, 833 P.2d
191 (1992); Thompson v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 161 Mont. 207, 505 P.2d 423 (1973)).
8. Beckman v. Butte-Silver Bow County, 2000 MT 112, 299 Mont. 389, 1 P.3d 348
(overruling Kemp v. Big Horn County Elec. Coop., Inc., 244 Mont. 437, 798 P.2d 999
(1990); Micheletto v. State, 244 Mont. 483, 798 P.2d 989 (1990); Kemp v. Bechtel Constr.
Co., 221 Mont. 519, 720 P.2d 270 (1986)).
9. Sherner v. Conoco, Inc., 2000 MT 50, 298 Mont. 401, 995 P.2d 990 (overruling
Calcaterra v. Mont. Res., 1998 MT 187, 289 Mont. 424, 962 P.2d 590; Schmidt v. State,
286 Mont. 98, 951 P.2d 23 (1997); Lockwood v. W.R. Grace & Co., 272 Mont. 202, 900
P.2d 314 (1995); Blythe v. Radiometer Am., Inc., 262 Mont. 464, 866 P.2d 218 (1993);
Noonan v. Spring Creek Forest Prods., Inc., 216 Mont. 221, 700 P.2d 623 (1985); Millers
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Strainer, 204 Mont. 162, 663 P.2d 338 (1983); Great W. Sugar Co. v.
Dist. Court, 188 Mont. 1, 610 P.2d 717 (1980)).
10. State v. LaMere, 2000 MT 45, 298 Mont. 358, 2 P.3d 204 (overruling State v.
Robbins, 1998 MT 297, 292 Mont. 23, 971 P.2d 359).
11. State v. Bales, 1999 MT 334, 297 Mont. 402, 994 P.2d 17 (overruling State v.
Morse, 229 Mont. 222, 746 P.2d 108 (1987)).
12. State v. Waters, 1999 MT 229, 296 Mont. 101, 987 P.2d 1142 (overruling City of
Bozeman v. Peterson, 227 Mont. 418, 739 P.2d 958 (1987); State v. Redding, 208 Mont.
24, 675 P.2d 974 (1984)).
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13. State v. Montoya, 1999 MT 180, 295 Mont. 288, 983 P.2d 937 (overruling State v.
Gunderson, 282 Mont. 183, 936 P.2d 804 (1997); State v. White, 200 Mont. 123, 650 P.2d
765 (1982); State v. Davison, 188 Mont. 432, 614 P.2d 489 (1980)).
14. Estate of Lande, 1999 MT 179, 295 Mont. 277, 983 P.2d 316 (overruling Craver v.
Waste Mgmt. Partners, 265 Mont. 37, 874 P.2d 1 (1994)).
15. State v. Worrall, 1999 MT 55, 293 Mont. 439, 976 P.2d 968 (overruling State v.
Feland, 267 Mont. 112, 882 P.2d 500 (1994); State v. Mosley, 260 Mont. 109, 860 P.2d 69
(1993); State v. Sykes, 194 Mont. 14, 663 P.2d 691 (1983)).
16. Craig v. Schell, 1999 MT 40, 293 Mont. 323, 975 P.2d 820 (overruling Lyndes v.
Scofield, 180 Mont. 177, 589 P.2d 1000 (1979)).
17. Marshall v. State ex rel. Cooney, 1999 MT 33, 293 Mont. 274, 975 P.2d 325
(overruling State v. Cooney, 70 Mont. 355, 225 P. 1007 (1924); State v. Alderson, 49
Mont. 387, 142 P. 210 (1914) (Hay); State v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 34 Mont. 426, 87 P. 450
(1906) (Teague)).
18. Whidden v. John S. Nerison, Inc., 1999 MT 110, 294 Mont. 346, 981 P.2d 271
(overruling Medicine Horse v. Trustees, 251 Mont. 65, 823 P.2d 230 (1991)).
19. Lewis v. B & B Pawnbrokers, Inc., 1998 MT 302, 292 Mont. 82, 968 P.2d 1145
(overruling Celmer v. Schmitt, 198 Mont. 271, 645 P.2d 946 (1982)).
20. Town Pump, Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 1998 MT 294, 292 Mont. 6, 971 P.2d 349
(overruling State ex rel. City of Libby v. Haswell, 147 Mont. 492, 414 P.2d 652 (1966)).
21. State v. Kuneff, 1998 MT 287, 291 Mont. 474, 970 P.2d 556 (overruling State v.
Siegal, 281 Mont. 250, 934 P.2d 176 (1997); State v. Rydberg, 239 Mont. 70, 778 P.2d 902
(1989)).
22. Bush v. Mont. Dep't of Justice, 1998 MT 270, 291 Mont. 359, 968 P.2d 716
(overruling McCullugh v. State, 259 Mont. 406, 856 P.2d 958 (1993); Jess v. State, 255
Mont. 254, 841 P.2d 1137 (1992); Grinde v. State, 249 Mont. 77, 813 P.2d 473 (1991);
Boland v. State, 242 Mont. 520, 792 P.2d 1 (1990); Gebhardt v. State, 238 Mont. 90, 775
P.2d 1261 (1989); State v. Lee, 232 Mont. 105, 754 P.2d 512 (1988); In re Suspension of
Driver's License of Blake, 220 Mont. 27, 712 P.2d 1338 (1986); State v. Davis, 190 Mont.
285, 620 P.2d 1209 (1980)).
23. In re Marriage of Beadle, 1998 MT 225, 291 Mont. 1, 968 P.2d 698 (overruling
Goodmunson v. Goodmunson, 201 Mont. 535, 655 P.2d 509 (1982)).
24. State v. Dahlin, 1998 MT 113, 289 Mont. 182, 961 P.2d 1247 (overruling State v.
McCartney, 179 Mont. 49, 585 P.2d 1321 (1978)).
25. Hulse v. State Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 1998 MT 108, 289 Mont. 1, 961 P.2d 75
(overruling State v. Purdie, 209 Mont. 352, 680 P.2d 576 (1984)).
26. Hansen v. 75 Ranch Co., 1998 MT 77, 288 Mont. 310, 957 P.2d 32 (overruling
McCann Ranch, Inc. v. Quigley-McCann, 276 Mont. 205, 915 P.2d 239 (1996)).
27. Town of Whitehall v. Preece, 1998 MT 53, 288 Mont. 55, 956 P.2d 743 (overruling
Choteau County v. Grossman, 172 Mont. 373, 563 P.2d 1125 (1977); Dieruf v. City of
Bozeman, 173 Mont. 447, 568 P.2d 127 (1977)).
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28. Ridley v. Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co., 286 Mont. 325, 951 P.2d 987 (1997) (overruling
Juedeman v. Nat'l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co., 253 Mont. 278, 833 P.2d 191 (1992)).
29. State v. Lane, 1998 MT 76, 288 Mont. 286, 957 P.2d 9 (overruling State v.
Graveley, 275 Mont. 519, 915 P.2d 184 (1996); State v. Mason, 253 Mont. 419, 833 P.2d
1058 (1992); State v. Wirtala, 231 Mont. 264, 752 P.2d 177 (1988); State v. Enfinger, 222
Mont. 438, 722 P.2d 1170 (1986)).
30. State v. Olson, 286 Mont. 364, 951 P.2d 571 (1997) (overruling State v. Medina,
245 Mont. 25, 798 P.2d 1032 (1990); State v. Howie, 228 Mont. 497, 744 P.2d 156 (1987);
State v. D.B.S., 216 Mont. 234, 700 P.2d 630 (1985); State v. Rogers, 213 Mont. 302, 692
P.2d 2 (1984)).
31. Richardson v. Corvallis Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 286 Mont. 309, 950 P.2d 748 (1997)
(overruling Davis v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 244 Mont. 61, 796 P.2d
181 (1990); Blaskovich v. Noreast Dev. Corp., 242 Mont. 326, 790 P.2d 977 (1990);
Boehm v. Alanon Club, 222 Mont. 373, 722 P.2d 1160 (1986); Kronen v. Richter, 211
Mont. 208, 683 P.2d 1315 (1984); Krone v. McCann, 196 Mont. 260, 638 P.2d 397 (1982);
Cereck v. Albertson's Inc., 195 Mont. 409, 637 P.2d 509 (1981); Rennick v. Hoover, 186
Mont. 167, 606 P.2d 1079 (1980); Dunham v. Southside Nat'l Bank, 169 Mont. 466, 548
P.2d 1383 (1976); Demaree v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 162 Mont. 47, 508 P.2d 570 (1973);
Uhl v. Abrahams, 160 Mont. 426, 503 P.2d 26 (1972); Willis v. St. Peter's Hosp., 157
Mont. 417, 486 P.2d 593 (1971); Luebeck v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 152 Mont. 88, 446 P.2d
921 (1968); Regedahl v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 149 Mont. 229, 425 P.2d 335 (1967)).
32. Blackburn v. Blue Mountain Women's Clinic, 286 Mont. 60, 951 P.2d 1 (1997)
(overruling Wisher v. Higgs, 257 Mont. 132, 849 P.2d 152 (1993); Major v. N. Valley
Hosp., 233 Mont. 25, 759 P.2d 153 (1988); Monroe v. Harper, 164 Mont. 23, 518 P.2d 788
(1974)).
33. State v. Strizich, 286 Mont. 1, 952 P.2d 1365 (1997) (overruling State v. Yarns,
252 Mont. 45, 826 P.2d 543 (1992); State v. T.W., 220 Mont. 280, 715 P.2d 428 (1986)).
34. State v. Lawrence, 285 Mont. 140, 948 P.2d 186 (1997) (overruling State v.
McSloy, 127 Mont. 265, 261 P.2d 663 (1953)).
35. State v. Lawrence, 285 Mont. 140, 948 P.2d 186 (1997) (overruling State v.
Goodwin, 249 Mont. 1, 813 P.2d 953 (1991)).
36. Lynch v. Reed, 284 Mont. 321, 944 P.2d 218 (1997) (overruling Hackley v.
Waldorf-Hoerner Paper Prods. Co., 149 Mont. 286, 425 P.2d 712 (1967)).
37. State v. Granby, 283 Mont. 193, 939 P.2d 1006 (1997) (overruling State v. Walsh,
281 Mont. 70, 931 P.2d 42 (1997)).
38. State v. Hendrickson, 283 Mont. 105, 939 P.2d 985 (1997) (overruling Maney v.
State, 255 Mont. 270, 842 P.2d 704 (1992)).
39. Erickson v. State ex rel. Bd. of Med. Exam's, 282 Mont. 367, 938 P.2d 625 (1997)
(overruling Gilpin v. Bd. of Nursing, 254 Mont. 308, 837 P.2d 1342 (1992); Mills v.
Comm'r of Ins., 226 Mont. 387, 736 P.2d 102 (1987)).
40. Trankel v. State, 282 Mont. 348, 938 P.2d 614 (1997) (overruling Evans v. Mont.
Nat'l Guard, 223 Mont. 482, 726 P.2d 1160 (1986)).
41. Orozco v. Day, 281 Mont. 341, 934 P.2d 1009 (1997) (overruling Remington v.
Mont. Dep't of Corr. & Human Servs., 255 Mont. 480, 844 P.2d 50 (1992)).
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42. Albright v. State, 281 Mont. 196, 933 P.2d 815 (1997) (overruling Butte Country
Club v. Dep't of Revenue, 186 Mont. 424, 608 P.2d 111 (1980)).
43. In re Estate of Hill, 281 Mont. 142, 931 P.2d 1320 (1997) (overruling Seman v.
Lewis, 252 Mont. 508, 830 P.2d 1294 (1992)).
44. Madill v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 280 Mont. 450, 930 P.2d 665 (1997) (overruling
Field v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 257 Mont. 81, 847 P.2d 306 (1993); Komeotis v.
Williamson Fencing, 232 Mont. 340, 756 P.2d 1153 (1988); Lasar v E.H. Oftedahl &
Sons, 222 Mont. 251, 721 P.2d 352 (1986)).
45. Wareing v. Schreckendgust, 280 Mont. 196, 930 P.2d 37 (1996) (overruling Brown
v. Tintinger, 245 Mont. 373, 801 P.2d 607 (1990); Downing v. Grover, 237 Mont. 172, 772
P.2d 850 (1989)).
46. Hafner v. Mont. Dep't of Labor and Indus., 280 Mont. 95, 929 P.2d 233 (1996)
(overruling Stine v. W. Fed. Sav. Bank, 266 Mont. 83, 879 P.2d 53 (1994); Connolly v.
Mont. Bd. of Labor Appeals, 226 Mont. 201, 734 P.2d 1211 (1987)).
47. In re Marriage of Cowan, 279 Mont. 491, 928 P.2d 214 (1996) (overruling in part
In re Marriage of Malquist, 266 Mont. 447, 880 P.2d 1357 (1994); In re Marriage of
Durbin, 251 Mont. 51, 823 P.2d 243 (1991)).
48. Ness v. Anaconda Minerals Co., 279 Mont. 472, 929 P.2d 205 (1996) (overruling
Getten v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 240 Mont. 90, 782 P.3d 1267 (1989); Hall v. State Comp.
Ins. Fund, 218 Mont. 180, 708 P.2d 234 (1985); Brandner v. Travelers Ins. Co., 179 Mont.
208, 587 P.2d 933 (1978)).
49. Kills On Top v. State, 279 Mont. 384, 928 P.2d 182 (1996) (overruling State v.
Kills on Top, 243 Mont. 56, 793 P.2d 1273 (1990)).
50. Plumb v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Court, 279 Mont. 363, 927 P.2d 1011 (1996)
(overruling Craig v. Mont. Tenth Judicial Dist. Court, 262 Mont. 201, 864 P.2d 791
(1993); State ex rel. Nelson v. Mont. Ninth Judicial Dist. Court, 262 Mont. 70, 863 P.2d
1027 (1993); Associated Press v. State, 250 Mont. 299, 820 P.2d 421 (1991); State ex rel.
Racicot v. Dist. Court, 244 Mont. 521, 798 P.2d 1004 (1990)).
51. State v. Gatts, 279 Mont. 42, 928 P.2d 114 (1996) (overruling State v. Fertterer,
255 Mont. 73, 841 P.2d 467 (1992)).
52. Haugen v. Blaine Bank, 279 Mont. 1, 926 P.2d 1364 (1996) (overruling Livingston
v. Treasure County, 239 Mont. 511, 781 P.2d 1129 (1989)).
53. In re M.L.M., 278 Mont. 505, 926 P.2d 694 (1996) (overruling In re F.H., 272
Mont. 342, 901 P.2d 96 (1995); Lewis v. Catholic Soc. Servs., 253 Mont. 369, 833 P.2d
1023 (1992)).
54. Keating v. Sherlock, 278 Mont. 218, 924 P.2d 1297 (1996) (overruling State ex rel.
Forsythe v. Dist. Court, 216 Mont. 480, 701 P.2d 1346 (1985); State ex rel. LaFlesch v.
Dist. Court, 165 Mont. 302, 529 P.2d 1403 (1974)).
55. Estate of Strever v. Cline, 278 Mont. 165, 924 P.2d 666 (1996) (overruling Schafer
v. State, 181 Mont. 102, 592 P.2d 493 (1979); Brown v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 154
Mont. 79, 460 P.2d 97 (1969); Lencioni v. Long, 139 Mont. 135, 361 P.2d 455 (1961)).
56. State v. Helfrich, 277 Mont. 452, 922 P.2d 1159 (1996) (overruling Griffin v.
Opinion Publ'g Co., 114 Mont. 502, 138 P.2d 580 (1943)).
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57. Hilands Golf Club v. Ashmore, 277 Mont. 324, 922 P.2d 469 (1996) (overruling
Fife v. Martin, 261 Mont. 471, 863 P.2d 403 (1993)).
58. State v. Tadewaldt, 277 Mont. 261, 922 P.2d 463 (1996) (overruling State v.
Pierce, 199 Mont. 57, 647 P.2d 847 (1982)).
59. In re A.R.A., 277 Mont. 66, 919 P.2d 388 (1996) (overruling In re Paternity of
C.G., 228 Mont. 118, 740 P.2d 1139 (1987); Brost v. Glasgow, 200 Mont. 194, 651 P.2d 32
(1982)).
60. Busta v. Columbus Hosp. Corp., 276 Mont. 342, 916 P.2d 122 (1996) (overruling
Kitchen Krafters, Inc. v. Eastside Bank, 242 Mont. 155, 789 P.2d 567 (1990)).
61. Roberts v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 276 Mont. 225, 915 P.2d 872 (1996)
(order denying motion to dismiss) (overruling Kinion v. Design Sys., Inc., 190 Mont. 226,
620 P.2d 852 (1980); Shields v. Pirkle Refrigerated Freightlines, 181 Mont. 37, 591 P.2d
1120 (1979)).
62. Rasmussen v. Lee, 276 Mont. 84, 916 P.2d 98 (1996) (overruling Holliday Land &
Livestock Co. v. Pierce, 174 Mont. 393, 571 P.2d 93 (1977); Pipkin v. Connolly, 167 Mont.
284, 538 P.2d 347 (1975); Miller v. Meredith, 149 Mont. 125, 423 P.2d 595 (1967);
Kenfield v. Curry, 145 Mont. 174, 399 P.2d 999 (1965); Enott v. Hinkle, 140 Mont. 206,
369 P.2d 413 (1962); Hamilton v. Rock, 121 Mont. 245, 191 P.2d 663 (1948)).
63. Stratemeyer v. Lincoln County, 276 Mont. 67, 915 P.2d 175 (1996) (overruling
Rouse v. Anaconda-Deer Lodge County, 250 Mont. 1, 817 P.2d 690 (1991)).
64. Turner v. Mountain Eng'g and Constr., Inc., 276 Mont. 55, 915 P.2d 799 (1996)
(overruling Traders State Bank v. Mann, 258 Mont. 226, 852 P.2d 604 (1993); Moore v.
Hardy, 230 Mont. 158, 748 P.2d 477 (1988); LeClair v. Reiter, 233 Mont. 332, 760 P.2d
740 (1988); First Nat'l Bank v. Giles, 225 Mont. 467, 733 P.2d 357 (1987); First Sec.
Bank v. Income Props., Inc., 208 Mont. 121, 675 P.2d 982 (1984); Mont. Nat'l Bank v.
State Dep't of Revenue, 167 Mont. 429, 539 P.2d 722 (1975) (reviving Gallatin Trust &
Sav. Bank v. Henke, 154 Mont. 170, 461 P.2d 448 (1969))).
65. State v. Loh, 275 Mont. 460, 914 P.2d 592 (1996) (overruling State v Stubbs, 270
Mont. 364, 892 P.2d 547 (1995); State v. Williams, 268 Mont. 428, 887 P.2d 1171 (1994);
State v. Hembd, 235 Mont. 361, 767 P.2d 864 (1989); State v. Osteen, 216 Mont. 258, 700
P.2d 188 (1985); State v. O'Neill, 208 Mont. 386, 679 P.2d 760 (1984); State v. Godsey,
202 Mont. 100, 656 P.2d 811 (1982); State v. Lane, 175 Mont. 225, 573 P.2d 198 (1977);
State v. Gallagher, 162 Mont. 155, 509 P.2d 852 (1973)).
66. Heiat v. E. Mont. Coll., 275 Mont. 322, 912 P.2d 787 (1996) (overruling Kenyon v.
Stillwater County, 254 Mont. 142, 835 P.2d 742 (1992)).
67. Porter v. Galarneau, 275 Mont. 174, 911 P.2d 1143 (1996) (overruling In re
Marriage of Elser, 271 Mont. 265, 895 P.2d 619 (1995); AgAmerica, FCB v. Robson, 272
Mont. 413, 901 P.2d 100 (1995); Brockie v. Omo Constr., Inc., 268 Mont. 519, 887 P.2d
167 (1994); Ihler v. Chisholm, 259 Mont. 240, 855 P.2d 1009 (1993); Haines Pipeline
Constr., Inc. v. Mont. Power Co., 251 Mont. 422, 830 P.2d 1230 (1991); West-Mont Cmty.
Care v. Bd. of Health & Envtl. Scis., 217 Mont. 178, 703 P.2d 850 (1985); Lee v Flathead
County, 217 Mont. 370, 704 P.2d 1060 (1985)).
68. Malee v. Dist. Court, 275 Mont. 72, 911 P.2d 831 (1996) (overruling State ex rel.
Kidder v. Dist. Court, 155 Mont. 442, 472 P.2d 1008 (1970); State ex rel. Porter v. First
Judicial Dist., 123 Mont. 447, 215 P.2d 279 (1950); State ex rel. Stagg v. Dist. Court, 76
Mont. 495, 248 P.2d 213 (1926)).
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69. Tillett v. Lippert,
Inc. v. Gallatin-Madison
134 Mont. 445, 333 P.2d
123 Mont. 513, 217 P.2d

Vol. 65

275 Mont. 1, 909 P.2d 1158 (1996) (overruling Frank DeHaan,
Ranch Co., 250 Mont. 304, 820 P.2d 423 (1991); Ivins v. Hardy,
471 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1001 (1959); Ivins v. Hardy,
204 (1950)).

70. State v. Docken, 274 Mont. 296, 908 P.2d 213 (1995) (overruling State v.
Downing, 181 Mont. 242, 593 P.2d 43 (1979)).
71. Glenn v. Grosfield, 274 Mont. 192, 906 P.2d 201 (1995) (overruling Scott v.
Weinheimer, 140 Mont. 554, 374 P.2d 91 (1962)).
72. Haag v. Mont. Sch. Group Ins. Auth., 274 Mont. 109, 906 P.2d 693 (1995)
(overruling Solheim v. Tom Davis Ranch, 208 Mont. 265, 677 P.2d 1034 (1984)).
73. Kills On Top v. State, 273 Mont. 32, 901 P.2d 1368 (1995) (overruling State v.
Henricks, 206 Mont. 469, 672 P.2d 20 (1983)).
74. Allers v. Riley, 273 Mont. 1, 901 P.2d 600 (1995) (overruling Ahmann v. Am. Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 235 Mont. 184, 766 P.2d 853 (1988); Easterday v. Canty, 219 Mont.
420, 712 P.2d 1305 (1986)).
75. In re Marriage of Miller, 273 Mont. 286, 902 P.2d 1019 (1995) (overruling In re
Marriage of Lyman, 233 Mont. 283, 762 P.2d 203 (1988); Witbart v. Witbart, 216 Mont.
178, 701 P.2d 339 (1985); In re Marriage of Madden, 211 Mont. 237, 683 P.2d 493 (1984);
Pilati v. Pilati, 181 Mont. 182, 592 P.2d 1374 (1979); In re Bad Yellow Hair, 162 Mont.
107, 509 P.2d 9 (1973)).
76. State v. Bullock, 272 Mont. 361, 901 P.2d 61 (1995) (overruling State v. Sorenson,
243 Mont. 321, 792 P.2d 363 (1990); State v. Bennett, 205 Mont. 117, 666 P.2d 747
(1983); State v. Dess, 201 Mont. 456, 655 P.2d 149 (1982); State v. Charvat, 175 Mont.
267, 573 P.2d 660 (1978)).
77. State v. Rothacher, 272 Mont. 303, 901 P.2d 82 (1995) (overruling State v. Byers,
261 Mont. 17, 861 P.2d 860 (1993); State v. Van Dyken, 242 Mont. 415, 791 P.2d 1350
(1990); State v. McKimmie, 232 Mont, 227, 756 P.2d 1135 (1988); State v. Sigler, 210
Mont. 248, 688 P.2d 749 (1984); State v.Starr, 204 Mont. 210, 664 P.2d 893 (1983)).
78. State v. Egelhoff, 272 Mont. 114, 900 P.2d 260 (1995) (overruling State v. Byers,
261 Mont. 17, 861 P.2d 860 (1993)).
79. Kloepfer v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 272 Mont. 78, 899 P.2d 1081 (1995)
(overruling Stevens v. State Comp. Mut. Ins. Fund, 268 Mont. 460, 886 P.2d 962 (1994);
Baeta v. Don Tripp Trucking, 254 Mont. 487, 839 P.2d 566 (1992); Witty v. Pluid, 220
Mont. 272, 714 P.2d 169 (1986)).
80. First Call, Inc. v. Capital Answering Serv., Inc., 271 Mont. 425, 898 P.2d 96
(1995) (overruling State ex rel. Equity Supply Co. v. Dist. Court, 159 Mont. 34, 494 P.2d
911 (1972); Whitcraft v. Semenza, 145 Mont. 94, 399 P.2d 757 (1965)).
81. Greens at Fort Missoula, LLC v. City of Missoula, 271 Mont. 398, 897 P.2d 1078
(1995) (overruling Lowe v. City of Missoula, 165 Mont. 38, 525 P.2d 551 (1974)).
82. Sacco v. High Country Indep. Press, Inc., 271 Mont. 209, 896 P.2d 411 (1995)
(overruling Lence v. Hagadone Inv. Co., 258 Mont. 433, 853 P.2d 1230 (1993); Doohan v.
Bigfork Sch. Dist. No. 38, 247 Mont. 125, 805 P.2d 1354 (1991); Niles v. Big Sky
Eyewear, 236 Mont. 455, 771 P.2d 114 (1989); First Bank (N.A.)-Billings v. Clark, 236
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Mont. 195, 771 P.2d 84 (1989); Shiplet v. First Sec. Bank of Livingston, Inc., 234 Mont.
166, 762 P.2d 242 (1988); Frigon v. Morrison-Maierle, Inc., 233 Mont. 113, 760 P.2d 57
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